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Introduction
Few books in recent years have so deeply influenced the thinking of Bud-dhists in Japan and elsewhere as Brian Daizen Victoria’s Zen at War 
(Victoria 1997). The book’s great contribution is that it has succeeded, where 
others have not, in bringing to public attention the largely unquestioning sup-
port of Japanese Buddhists for their nation’s militarism in the years following 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868 (when Japan opened its borders after nearly 250 
years of feudal isolation) up until the end of WWII. As a Japanese Buddhist 
myself, I personally feel a deep sense of gratitude that this aspect of our his-
tory has been so clearly brought to light, since it is imperative that all Japanese 
Buddhists recognize and take responsibility for their traditions’ complicity in 
the militarist government’s actions. This applies to the Pure Land and Nichi-
ren traditions as much as it does to Zen. Unless Japanese Buddhists sincerely 
repent these mistakes and determine never to repeat them, they cannot awaken 
to the true spirit of peace that is the necessary starting point for the creation 
of a world free of war. Buddhists everywhere must rediscover this spirit and 
make it the basis of all their activities, both at the personal and institutional 
levels. Otherwise, even if we promote harmony and nonviolence externally, 
1 An earlier version of this article was published in Japanese as “Suzuki Daisetsu no Makoto” 
鈴木大拙のまこと, Matsugaoka bunko kenkyū nenpō 松ヶ岡文庫研究年報 21 (2007), pp. 1–56. 
The present article was translated and revised for publication in English by the author and the 
translator.
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internally our thoughts and actions will not partake of the Dharma-seal of 
enlightenment.
Despite its many contributions, however, Zen at War left me with the 
impression that the author, in his desire to present as strong a case as pos-
sible, often allowed his political concerns to take precedence over scholarly 
accuracy. This was especially the case with regard to his portrayal of Daisetsu 
Teitarō Suzuki (1870–1966), whom Victoria depicts as an active supporter of 
the Japanese WWII war effort. This is a very serious accusation, given the 
importance of the issues raised in Zen at War. 
I had the opportunity to become closely acquainted with Suzuki and his 
views on war when I worked at the Matsugaoka Bunko 松ヶ岡文庫 in Kama-
kura under his guidance from 1964 until his death in 1966. This period of 
contact with Suzuki, as well as my own study of his works in the years since 
then, have left me with an impression of Suzuki and his thought that is far dif-
ferent from the picture presented by Victoria. This disparity, combined with 
the desire to set the record straight, have inspired the present attempt to clarify 
what I regard as Suzuki’s true attitude to war.
All scholars employ quotations from relevant texts to support and develop 
their arguments, and are of course at liberty to select those passages that best 
suit their purposes. Even so, Victoria’s highly selective citations from Suzuki’s 
works often seem motivated less by a desire to clarify Suzuki’s actual views 
than by a determination to present a certain picture of the man and his work. 
As I read Zen at War, wondering if Suzuki had indeed taken the positions 
that Victoria attributes to him, I checked each and every quotation against 
the original Japanese texts, an experience that left me with a number of ques-
tions regarding his use of Suzuki’s writings. Ideally, every position attributed 
to Suzuki in Zen at War deserves close reexamination, but considerations of 
space do not allow this. I will attempt, nevertheless, to evaluate the points Vic-
toria raises and the evidence he presents as I clarify what I feel are Suzuki’s 
true views. In the process I will quote rather liberally from his works in order 
to provide the reader with as a full a context as possible.
Victoria attacks Suzuki on several different points, which may be sum-
marized as: (1) Suzuki, particularly in his first book, Shin shūkyō ron 新宗教
論 (1896, hereafter A New Theory of Religion) and subsequent writings on 
Bushido, actively supported Japanese militarism and its actions; (2) Suzuki 
was a proponent of Japan’s aggression in China during the Second World 
War; and (3) Suzuki in his postwar writings continued to defend the war and 
attempted to evade responsibility for his own wartime complicity.
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These criticisms, if true, would of course reveal Suzuki to be a willing col-
laborator in the tragic course followed by Japan during WWII. Let us there-
fore examine Suzuki’s writings in the context of Victoria’s critiques in order 
to determine the merits of the latter’s allegations. I have adopted a primarily 
chronological approach, not only for the sake of clarity but also to show the 
development of Suzuki’s thought over the course of his long life. 
A New Theory of Religion
A New Theory of Religion, and in particular the chapter “Shūkyō to kokka 
to no kankei” 宗教と国家との関係 (hereafter “The Relation of Religion and 
State”), is the text most often cited by Victoria, whose interpretation of it 
forms one of the foundations of his characterization of Suzuki’s nationalist 
and militarist views. Since it is also Suzuki’s first published book, it is an 
especially appropriate text with which to begin our discussion.
It would be helpful to first briefly situate the book in the context of 
Suzuki’s seventy-year career as an author and educator. A New Theory of 
Religion was published in 1896, when Suzuki was twenty-six years old 
and before he had undergone any of the major formative experiences of his 
early adulthood: the Zen awakening that he describes as occurring in De-
cember, 1896, and as fundamentally altering the way he interacted with the 
world; his first extended residence in the United States and Europe between 
1897 and 1909; and his marriage in 1911 to the American woman Beatrice 
Erskine Lane (1873–1939).2 His country, Japan, was just twenty-eight years 
out of the feudal era and still under the threat of the Western powers that 
controlled much of the rest of Asia. Although in the 1894–1895 Sino-Jap-
anese War it had prevailed over the forces of Qing-dynasty China, the sub-
sequent Tripartite Intervention of Russia, Germany, and France in 1895 had 
deprived it of its territorial gains, forcing it to recognize that it was not yet 
2 From a Zen point of view, the fact that Suzuki spent the years subsequent to his first 
awakening—the period of “post-enlightenment training,” traditionally regarded as the period 
when the awakening is clarified, refined, and then integrated into everyday life—in America is 
highly significant, for it means that the foundations of his development as a Zen thinker were 
laid while he was in constant contact with the peoples, cultures, and languages of the West. 
Suzuki’s eleven years working under the liberal thinker and publisher Paul Carus (1852–1919) 
in the town of LaSalle, Illinois, virtually without contact with other Japanese, provided him 
with the ideal situation to internalize the English language and assimilate cultural views quite 
different from those of Japan.
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in a position to militarily resist the European powers, and leaving it acutely 
aware of the fact that nearly every other nation in Asia had been colonized 
either economically or militarily by the European nations.
Citing these historical circumstances, Victoria presents A New Theory of 
Religion as a central text in the development of a Buddhist rationale for the 
military buildup that Japan had embarked upon in response to the challenge 
from the West:
The short period of peace which lasted from 1896 to 1903 was also 
a time for Buddhist scholars to turn their attention to the theoreti-
cal side of the relationship between Buddhism, the state, and war. 
Interestingly, it was the twenty-six-year-old Buddhist scholar and 
student of Zen, D. T. Suzuki, who took the lead in this effort. In 
November 1896, just one month before having his initial enlighten-
ment experience (kenshō), he published a book entitled A Treatise 
on the New [Meaning of] Religion (Shin Shūkyō Ron) . . . [in which 
he devoted] an entire chapter to “The Relationship of Religion and 
the State.”3
A New Theory of Religion, as Victoria notes, is a wide-ranging collec-
tion of essays on various subjects relating to religion, with chapter titles like 
“Kami” 神 (God), “Shinkō” 信仰 (Faith), “The Relation of Religion and State,” 
“Shūkyō to dōtoku no kubetsu” 宗教と道徳の区別 (The Distinction between 
Religion and Morality), and “Shūkyō to katei” 宗教と家庭 (Religion and the 
Family). The chapter in question, “The Relation of Religion and State,” deals 
with an issue of natural concern in any overview of the meaning of religion: 
the relation between the political reality of the state, the ideals of religion, and 
the inner, spiritual life of the individual. As part of its consideration of this 
relationship, it discusses the subject of religion and war. The following are the 
passages in “The Relation of Religion and State” most directly related to this 
particular topic:
Let us look at the actual situation among the world’s nations today. 
Each has established a country on a piece of this tiny earth, claim-
ing that country’s territory as its territory, that country’s products as 
its products, and that country’s people as its people. If conflicts arise 
between the interests of the respective nations, they soon forsake 
3 Victoria 1997, p. 22.
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peace and, taking up arms, kill people, halt commerce, and destroy 
production, continuing at this until one side or the other is defeated. 
However, owing perhaps to their ideals of civilized behavior, they 
prefer not to admit that self-interest is behind all of this, so they 
always use “justice” as an excuse. “We attack them,” they claim, 
“for the purpose of maintaining long-term peace in the East (or the 
West, or the World).” Or, “They ignored our rights, and so, in the 
name of justice, we cannot remain silent.” Or, “We desire only to 
help that weak and impoverished nation attain independence and 
raise it to the status of a civilized state.” All this talk sounds so rea-
sonable, as if war could not have been avoided. But the truth of the 
situation is ugly indeed. Such countries are simply pursuing their 
own self-interests and at the same time curtailing the power of the 
other country. And this is accepted, because regardless of what the 
truth of the matter might be, “justice” can always be invoked as an 
excuse. 
And what of the weak and impoverished nations? No matter how 
much their rights are violated and their peace destroyed, no matter 
how much justice for them is ignored, and no matter how much 
humiliation they are subjected to, they have no choice but to stifle 
their anger and hide their resentment as they keep silent and bide 
their time. It is they who are truly in a position to cry for justice, 
but because they lack the power to implement it they cannot even 
invoke its name. International law exists in name only and is of no 
help to countries such as they. Those with the military power to do 
so call that which is wrong, right, and that which is evil, good, and 
in broad daylight rob and pillage as they please.
Even so, the age of barbarism is long gone. Nations are ever more 
clever in their strategy, ever more subtle in their approach. No lon-
ger do they turn immediately to force when faced with a problem, 
as the barbarians did. Their first tactic is diplomacy, through which 
they attempt to negotiate a solution. These so-called “diplomatic” 
initiatives are nothing but grand deceptions, employing bluffs to 
intimidate or cajolery to deceive, forming alliances in secret while 
feigning antagonism in public, or begging for compassion in front 
while sneering scornfully in back. Although the strategies are infi-
nite in variety, in the end all are nothing but scheming and intrigue. 
Only after they see that all their subterfuges have been tried and no 
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more tricks remain do the nations send their iron warships out to sea 
and dispatch their cannons to the fields. This is done as a last resort, 
and therein, I believe, lies the real difference between barbarism 
and civilization. We might therefore characterize present-day inter-
national relations as: beginning in self-interest, continuing in abuse, 
and ending in exhaustion.
This is, unfortunately, a credible depiction of contemporary 
associations between the nations. One has to admit that it diverges 
sharply from the ideals of religion, and it is only natural to question 
whether the state and religion can ever coexist. . . .
Argued in temporal terms, the formation of the state necessarily 
occurs at some point during the evolution of society, and must serve 
as a means to help humanity bring to realization the purpose of its 
existence. However, if seen as a stage that must be passed through 
in order to realize our purpose, we have no choice than to bear with 
it even if, for a time, it seems to be distancing us from that purpose. 
This is because that which exists as a necessary response to the 
demands of a particular time and place always partakes of the truth 
of that particular time and place; this is known as relative truth. 
Moreover, if a relative truth appears in response to a natural neces-
sity, how does it differ from an absolute truth? Insofar as both bear 
the nature of truth, we should act in accordance with them. Thus, 
although the state may be but a means, it comprises an intimation 
of truth. Religion too must to some extent vary in form according 
to time and place. That is, religion must, at the beginning, seek to 
support the existence of the state, in accordance with its history and 
the feelings of its people. . . . 
Although we do not know today what direction the future prog-
ress of society will take (and even if, as some scholars foretell, it 
becomes a single undifferentiated global entity), no one would agree 
that the present condition of international confrontation and rivalry 
constitutes the ideal state of things. Nevertheless, for the present 
one must act in accordance with the situation as it is. Therefore, as 
is clear from the discussion above, all enterprises that contribute 
to the progress of the nation should be undertaken, while keeping 
in mind that the nation as it is today is still short of the final goal 
and that it is desirable always to seek to improve it. This [dynamic 
toward improvement] is truly the sphere of religion. Religion does 
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not attempt to subvert the foundations of the state and replace them 
with something new; it simply strives for the state’s progress and 
development in accordance with its history and makeup.4
Thus the interests of religion and the state do not clash; rather, 
both sides can only hope for wholeness when they aid and sup-
port each other. Granted, the present state of ethics governing 
the relations between nations smells of the barbaric and is thus 
quite contrary to the ideals of religion, but the fact that justice and 
humanitarianism are even spoken about indicates that at the core 
[of those ethics] there is present at least a grain of moral sense. It is 
from within this inner moral sense that we must germinate the seed 
of religion. How then, is this to happen?
The problem is easily resolved if one thinks of religion as an 
entity with the state as its body, and of the state as something that 
develops with religion as its spirit. In other words, religion and the 
state form a unity; if every action and movement of the state takes 
on a religious character and if every word and action of religion 
takes on a state character, then whatever is done for the sake of 
the state is done for religion, and whatever is done for the sake of 
religion is done for the state. The two are one, and one is the two; 
differentiation is equality, and equality is differentiation; perfectly 
fused, there is not a hair’s width of separation between religion and 
the state.
If we look at this [unified relationship between religion and the 
state] from the point of view of international morality, we see that 
the purpose of maintaining soldiers and encouraging the military 
arts is not to conquer other countries and deprive them of their rights 
or freedom. Rather, they are done only to preserve the existence of 
one’s country and prevent it from being encroached upon by unruly 
heathens. The construction of heavy warships and the casting of 
cannons are not to increase personal gain and suppress the prosper-
ity of others. Rather, they are done only to prevent the history of 
one’s own country from disturbance by injustice and aggression. 
Conducting commerce and working to increase production are not 
for the purpose of building up material wealth in order to subdue 
4 The following portion of this article is also quoted by Kirita (1994, pp. 53–54) and Victoria 
(1997, pp. 23–25). While the translation here is based largely on their translations, we have 
made significant changes.
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other nations. Rather, they are done only in order to further expand 
human knowledge and bring about the perfection of morality. Thus, 
if an aggressive country comes and obstructs one’s commerce or 
violates one’s rights, this would truly interrupt the progress of all 
humanity. In the name of religion one’s country could not submit to 
this. There would be no choice other than to take up arms, not for 
the purpose of slaying the enemy, nor for the purpose of pillaging 
cities, let alone for the purpose of acquiring wealth. It would be, 
instead, simply to punish the people of the country representing 
injustice in order that justice might prevail.5 What could be self-
seeking about this? In any event, this would constitute religious 
conduct. As long as the state takes care not to lose this moral sense, 
one can anticipate the step by step advancement of humanity and 
the fulfillment of universal ideals.
The morality of the individual toward the state is similar to 
this. In peacetime one works diligently, day and night, seeking 
to promote the advancement of [such endeavors as] agriculture, 
manufacturing, commerce, art and science, and technology, never 
forgetting that the purpose of these endeavors is the advancement of 
all humanity. This is what is called “peacetime religion.” However, 
should hostilities commence with a foreign country, then sailors 
fight on the sea and soldiers fight in the fields, swords flashing and 
cannon smoke belching, moving this way and that while “regard-
ing their own lives as light as goose feathers and their duty is as 
heavy as Mount Taishan.” Should they fall on the battlefield they 
5 The translation of the preceding four sentences follows Victoria, with several significant dif-
ferences. Victoria has: “Therefore, if there is a lawless country which comes and obstructs our 
commerce, or tramples on our rights, this is something that would truly interrupt the progress 
of all humanity. In the name of religion our country could not submit to this. Thus, we would 
have no choice but to take up arms, not for the purpose of slaying the enemy, nor for the pur-
pose of pillaging cities, let alone for the purpose of acquiring wealth. Instead, we would simply 
punish the people of the country representing injustice in order that justice might prevail” 
(Victoria 1997, p. 109). The terms that he translates as “our commerce” (waga shōgyō 吾商業), 
“our rights” (waga kenri 吾権利), and “our country” (waga kuni 我国) can just as legitimately 
be translated with the more neutral expressions “one’s commerce,” “one’s rights,” and “one’s 
country.” These renderings are closer to the overall tone of the article (which is expressed in 
general terms), and of the paragraph in which they appear, where clearly neutral terms like 
jikoku 自国 (one’s country) precede the usage of waga shōgyō, waga kenri, and waga kuni. 
The use of “we” as the subject of the last two lines in Victoria’s translation does not reflect the 
original Japanese sentences, which are general statements in which no subject is identified.
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have no regrets. This is what is called “religion during the time of a 
[national] emergency.” Religion does not necessarily involve con-
cepts like “Buddha” or “God.” If one fulfills the demands of one’s 
duties, what could be more religious than that?6 
There is certainly much in these passages that raises images of national-
ism, particularly when viewed in the context of Japan’s subsequent history. 
An in-depth examination of this issue is obviously beyond the scope of this 
article, but I think it is at least necessary, before rushing to label Suzuki as a 
nationalist on the basis of the nineteenth-century prose of his youth, to con-
sider whether motives other than a desire to support militarism might have 
motivated his words.7
As a starting point to clarifying Suzuki’s position in “The Relation of Reli-
gion and State,” it is helpful to examine the interpretation of this chapter given 
by Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1902–1986), a Japanese scholar whose views 
on the relation between Japanese Buddhism and militarism were one of the 
principal influences on Victoria’s thought.8 Ichikawa, quoting statements in 
the chapter such as “religion should, first of all, seek to preserve the existence 
of the state,”9 regards the “The Relation of Religion and State” as a nationalist 
essay supportive of the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War:
Suzuki writes further that “if a lawless country (referring to 
China)10 comes and obstructs our commerce, or tramples on our 
rights, this is something that would truly interrupt the progress of all 
humanity. In the name of religion our country could not submit to 
this. Thus, we would have no choice but to take up arms, not for the 
purpose of slaying the enemy, nor for the purpose of pillaging cit-
ies, let alone for the purpose of acquiring wealth. Instead, we would 
simply punish the people of the country representing injustice in 
order that justice might prevail. How is it possible that we could 
6 Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū (hereafter abbreviated as SDZ), vol. 23, pp. 134–40. 
7 It is relevant to note that the types of expressions seen in this early piece regarding the relation 
of religion and the state are not found in Suzuki’s later works, which, as we will see below, are 
clearly cautious regarding this relationship.
8 See, for example, Victoria 1997, pp. ix–x, 167.
9 Ichikawa 1975, p. 35; translation by Victoria (1997, p. x). The passage from Suzuki’s A New 
Theory of Religion is found in SDZ, vol. 23, p. 137. 
10 The words in parentheses are Ichikawa’s addition (Ichikawa 1975, p. 35); the English transla-
tion is by Victoria (1997, p. 24). 
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seek anything for ourselves? In any event, this is what is called 
religious conduct.”11 Suzuki was claiming, in other words, that the 
Sino-Japanese War [1894–95] was a religious action undertaken to 
chastise the “belligerence” of China and promote human progress. 
This argument is, in form at the very least, precisely the same as the 
line of reasoning that Japan used to justify its fifteen-year conflict in 
Asia and the Pacific, glorifying it as a “Holy War for the Establish-
ment of a New Order in East Asia.” It seems not to have occurred 
to Suzuki that this “punitive war against a belligerent nation” was 
fought, not on Japanese soil against an invading China, but on the 
Asian continent in the territory of the Chinese. Nor did he seem 
able to see the situation from the standpoint of China, whose land 
and people were what was being “violated” in this conflict. It was 
his unreflective stance that allowed Suzuki to regard this invasive 
war as “religious action” undertaken “in the name of religion.” This 
way of thinking is, to use the words of the Record of Linji, “To be 
misled by the delusions of others, to be taken in by the falsehood 
around one.”12 
Victoria, following Ichikawa’s views, states in his foreword to Zen at War: 
With his oft-pictured gentle and sagacious appearance of later years, 
Suzuki is revered among many in the West as a true man of Zen. 
Yet he wrote that “religion should, first of all, seek to preserve the 
existence of the state,” followed by the assertion that the Chinese 
were “unruly heathens” whom Japan should punish “in the name of 
religion.”13 
11 This quotation apprears in SDZ, vol. 23, pp. 139–40. The translation of the quoted material 
is that in Victoria 1997, pp. 24–25.
12 Ichikawa 1975, p. 35.
13 Victoria 1997, p. x. Both quotes cited by Victoria are problematic. “Religion should, first 
of all, seek to preserve the existence of the state,” a translation of sunawachi shūkyō wa mazu 
kokka no sonzai o ijisen koto o hakaru 即ち宗教は先づ国家の存在を維持せんことを計る, is 
questionable for its rendering of the word mazu in the original. Mazu can mean anything from 
“the most important thing” or “first of all” (the nuance that Victoria gives it) to “for a start” or 
“to begin with.” The context of the discussion (see full paragraph, pp. 67–68, above) is one in 
which the existence of the state is regarded as a temporary stage in the development of human 
society but as an unavoidable one, and thus one that religion must work with during that stage. 
This suggests that a closer translation would be, “That is, religion must, at the beginning, seek 
to support the existence of the state.”
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Despite these depictions of “The Relation of Religion and State,” a fair read-
ing of the chapter reveals little to support Ichikawa’s and Victoria’s contention 
that Suzuki is referring to China when he speaks of “a lawless country,” or 
that his comments on war apply to the Sino-Japanese War.
The three-paragraph section beginning with “Let us look at the actual situa-
tion among the world’s nations today” is clearly a generalized portrayal of the 
contemporary attitudes and actions of the world’s powerful nations, modeled 
on those of the Western colonial nations. Suzuki’s description, flowery though 
it is, provides a fairly accurate picture of the sort of political and economic 
strategies that these countries employed in subjugating China, Southeast Asia, 
and the East Indies, and were still attempting to apply, with considerably less 
success, to Japan during the late nineteenth century.14 
The second section quoted above, in which Suzuki explicitly speaks of 
war—the section that Ichikawa and Victoria represent as justifying Japan’s 
actions in the Sino-Japanese War—never mentions China, and its description 
of a possible attack and defensive response is written in the conditional tense, 
not in the past tense as would be the case with a war already finished. The 
very fact that Suzuki does not refer to the war (and, indeed, rarely mentions 
it anywhere in the massive body of writings he produced)15 is significant in 
itself, given the virtually universal approval of the war in Japan at the time and 
the enthusiasm with which it was supported by other Japanese intellectuals. 
Moreover, Suzuki is clearly describing a defensive war fought on the home 
territory of the threatened nation, which was manifestly not the case for Japan 
The term translated by Victoria as “unruly heathens,” jama gedō 邪魔外道, and linked by 
him and Ichikawa to the Chinese, would logically apply not to the Chinese but, if anything, to 
non-Asian powers. Both jama and gedō are originally Buddhist terms that refer to those who 
hinder or oppose the Buddhist teachings, which the Chinese unquestionably were not. See also 
the following note.
14 In the decades prior to when Suzuki wrote, China had been attacked by Britain during the 
two Opium Wars (1839–42, 1856–60), fought by the British to preserve its Chinese opium 
trade. After its defeat, China was forced to sign a series of “unequal treaties,” in which it 
agreed to pay large indemnities, open a number of ports for trade, accept extraterritoriality for 
British citizens, and permit the sale of opium. France, Germany, and Russia soon demanded, 
and received, trading rights similar to those of Britain. By the mid-nineteenth century India 
and Burma had also been colonized by Britain, and Indochina by France. Meanwhile, Russia 
had moved into Central Asia and had further designs on territories in East Asia. All of this was 
common knowledge at the time when Suzuki was writing. The mention of “aggressive nations” 
would have brought the Western powers to mind, not China.
15 One case is his 1910 article in the journal Shin bukkyō 新仏教 (New Buddhism) (p. 83, 
below), in which he mentions the war in a context unflattering to the Japanese military.
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in its war with China. Ichikawa provides no reason, much less any evidence, 
for his assertion that this quite self-evident fact “did not occur” to Suzuki.
Furthermore, a nationalistic reading of the entire chapter would be out of 
accord with the rest of A New Theory of Religion. As mentioned above, the 
book is composed of a series of essays on topics of basic concern to religion, 
such as God, faith, ethics, and the role of religion in family life—subjects that 
are precisely what one would expect to find in a general overview of religion 
and its place in human existence. The chapter in question, “The Relation of 
Religion and State,” follows this pattern, discussing in a general way the 
evolving relationship between the individual, religion, and the political reality 
of the state, with no specific religions or nations being named. The discus-
sion includes the question of war, as any responsible analysis of the relation-
ship between religion and the state must. Although the passages on war are 
expressed in a nineteenth-century prose that does have a certain nationalistic 
tone, a balanced view of their content shows them to constitute, as we will 
consider below, a justification of defensive war only (as we will also see, the 
record shows Suzuki to have been consistenly opposed to invasive war). 
These early comments by Suzuki on religion and the state can easily be 
seen in a context that is not nationalistic. For example, let us look at the fol-
lowing passage:16 
The problem is easily resolved if one thinks of religion as an entity 
with the state as its body, and of the state as something develop-
ing with religion as its spirit. In other words, religion and the state 
form a unity; if every action and movement of the state takes on a 
religious character and if every word and action of religion takes on 
a state character, then whatever is done for the sake of the state is 
done for religion, and whatever is done for the sake of religion is 
done for the state.
This passage, taken alone, can certainly be seen as advocating the de facto 
subordination of religion to the state, but, appearing as it does in the context 
of Suzuki’s explanation of how it might be possible to nurture the flicker of 
spirituality that exists even in the contentious environment of governmental 
and international relations, it can also be seen as a relatively straightforward 
expression of the Confucian ideal of a balanced and harmonious relation 
between the spiritual and political aspects of human existence.17 Furthermore, 
16 See p. 67, above.
17 Suzuki did in fact have deep connections with Confucianism. Suzuki’s first Zen teacher, 
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Suzuki sets quite strict conditions for attainment of this unity between religion 
and state, describing a mutual dynamic in which “if every action and move-
ment of the state takes on a religious character” then “whatever is done for 
the sake of the state is done for religion,” and that “if every word and action 
of religion takes on a state character” then “whatever is done for the sake of 
religion is done for the state.” This was for Suzuki clearly the ideal and not the 
reality. As we will see shortly, Suzuki’s later writings clearly show that when 
it came to the actual political situation in Japan at this time, he was quite criti-
cal of the direction in which the country was heading.
Viewed in this context, Suzuki’s statements on the legitimacy of resistance 
when “an aggressive country comes and obstructs one’s commerce or violates 
one’s rights” can most reasonably be seen, not as a description of the war with 
China, but as a general, straightforward argument for the justness of defensive 
war, in which Suzuki outlines the conditions under which armed resistance 
would be warranted. Indeed, one can take the evidence just as it is—Suzuki’s 
support of defensive war, coupled with his willingness to resist the current 
of Japanese public opinion by remaining silent on the Sino-Japanese 
conflict—and arrive at a conclusion quite the opposite of Ichikawa’s. Given 
the fact that the conditions Suzuki describes as justifying armed defense—an 
impoverished nation exploited by stronger ones, its culture suppressed, its 
commerce obstructed, its rights trampled, and its territory invaded—applied 
more to late-nineteenth-century China than they did to Japan, and that Japan 
was among the nations threatening China, Suzuki’s words can even be seen as 
an implicit criticism of the Sino-Japanese War, insofar as the war was aggres-
sive in nature. At the very least, this interpretation is more in accord with the 
evidence than is Ichikawa’s, in view of the silence Suzuki maintained on this 
war and the consistently critical stance he took with regard to the Japanese 
military, as we will see in his writings below.
Before considering these writings, there is an important issue that must 
be addressed, that of pacifism. Suzuki’s forthright support for defensive war 
raises one of the issues central to the present discussion: whether war of any 
sort, aggressive or defensive, is justified in the context of Buddhism. This is 
a complex question, especially in light of Buddhism’s development from a 
tradition of world-renouncers to one that serves as the major faith of many 
Imakita Kōsen 今北洪川 (1815–1892) was a Confucian scholar before turning to Zen, and 
many of Suzuki’s publications during his early stay in America dealt with Confucianism (e.g., 
“A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy,” published in three parts in The Monist (Suzuki 
1907, Suzuki 1908a and Suzuki 1908b).
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large nations. Buddhism is usually associated with a strong stress on peace 
and nonviolence, and indeed, much of Victoria’s attack on Suzuki rests on a 
presumption that true Buddhism is necessarily pacifist. Zen at War discusses 
the “just war” concept in Buddhism at length, particularly in chapter 7, but 
always in contexts where the concept has been abused to justify wars that are 
manifestly unjust.18 No serious discussion is given to the possibility that there 
may indeed be situations—for example, clear-cut cases of genocide or inva-
sive wars—where the use of force is warranted even for Buddhists. Suzuki’s 
position was that of someone who recognized that war has been a persistent 
element in the lives of nations and that aggressive countries throughout his-
tory have attacked weaker ones, forcing even Buddhist nations to face the 
question of when armed resistance may be justified.
There is no clear consensus on this issue—even the briefest review of the 
literature on the subject shows that serious, thoughtful Buddhists have been 
debating it for centuries, without reaching any final conclusions. Since a full 
discussion of the issues involved is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, 
it will have to suffice for present purposes to acknowledge that there are at 
least two sides to the issue and that the position Suzuki took in this early 
volume is one that other committed Buddhists have publicly preferred to an 
absolutely pacifist position.
Whereas the pacifist position, in the sense of a total rejection of war 
and killing, has always been the ideal for the world-renouncing ordained 
sangha, enjoined upon them by numerous passages in the Buddhist canonical 
literature,19 Buddhist supporters of the notion of just war point out that 
with respect to his lay followers the Buddha recognized the necessity of 
armies and, by implication, the use of those armies.20 With the emergence of 
Buddhism as a religion of governments and large numbers of householders, 
questions that committed world renouncers do not have to face take on great 
importance. Do Buddhists have the right to defend themselves and their 
18 In the second edition of Zen at War, Victoria devotes an entire chapter, “Was it Buddhism?” 
(Victoria 2006, pp. 192–231) to the question of Buddhism and pacifism.
19 E.g., the Pāli Vinaya states that “a member of the Buddha’s order should not intentionally 
destroy the life of any being down to a worm or an ant” (Oldenberg 1964, p. 97).
20 For example, in the conversations recorded in numerous Pāli canonical texts between the 
Buddha and rulers, prominent among them the kings Pasenadi and Bimbisāra, the Buddha 
never enjoins them to abandon the maintenance of armies or the protection of the state. Certain 
Mahayana canonical scriptures, notably the Upāya-kauśalya sūtra, go further, hypothesizing 
situations in which it would be justifiable for a bodhisattva to kill in order to prevent a greater 
number of deaths.
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families from attackers? Or their countries from invaders? If not, were the 
Chinese Buddhists wrong to defend themselves against the Japanese armies 
in the 1930s? In point of fact, throughout history all Buddhist nations—
including those with strong traditions of ahiṃsā—have recognized the right of 
self-defense and found it necessary to maintain militaries. To reject defensive 
war for Buddhism is to reject virtually every historical manifestation of this 
important world religion, and restrict “true Buddhism” to a pristine “original 
Buddhism” (itself a hypothetical construct) and to certain groups of world 
renouncers.
It is in this context, I believe, that the statements on war by Suzuki in “The 
Relation of Religion and State” must be understood. If the maintenance of 
a military, and thus by implication its use, has been found necessary by all 
Buddhist nations, then this is clearly a topic that an author writing on the 
subject of “the relation of religion and state” must comment upon. When 
doing so—if the author is to deal with the topic honestly—it is essential to 
clarify the criteria that determine when the use of force is justified (jus ad bel-
lum), precisely because nations waging invasive, aggressive wars attempt to 
characterize them as just (militarist Japan during the 1930s being, of course, 
a prime example). The conditions that Suzuki delineates in “The Relation of 
Religion and State”—opposing obstructions to commerce, resisting invasion, 
preserving the existence of one’s country—although they could have been 
more diplomatically expressed, are basically ones that have been recognized 
everywhere as jus ad bellum.
There is one final matter that needs to be considered, before continuing,  a 
procedural issue relating to Victoria’s use of source materials both here and 
elsewhere. In introducing the chapter “The Relation of Religion and State,” 
Victoria writes: 
[Suzuki devotes] an entire chapter [of A New Treatise on Reli-
gion] to the “Relationship of Religion and the State.” If only be-
cause Suzuki’s views in this area are so little known in the West, 
it is instructive to take a careful look at his comments. Much more 
important, however, the views that Suzuki expressed then parallel 
the rationale that institutional Buddhism’s leaders would subse-
quently give for their support of Japan’s war efforts up through 
the end of the Pacific War.21
21 Victoria 1997, pp. 22–23.
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The claim that Suzuki’s views “parallel” the rationale of institutional Bud-
dhist leaders who supported the war, in itself a questionable assertion, implies 
that Suzuki shared the views of these leaders or that his obscure, early text, 
published half a century earlier, was in some way responsible for their think-
ing. Since Victoria provides no evidence of an actual connection between 
Suzuki’s views and those of the pro-war Buddhist leaders, this claim amounts 
to an attempt to discredit Suzuki through guilt by association. Unfortunately, 
guilt by association is a polemical device Victoria employs repeatedly in Zen 
at War and in other writings criticizing Buddhist figures. One such instance, 
and a clear refutation of the type of logic behind it, is offered by the Japanese 
scholar Miyata Koichi:
Victoria quotes a passage from Makiguchi’s 1903 work Jinsei 
Chirigaku (The Geography of Human Life), in which Makiguchi 
notes that Russia was engaged in a policy of expansionism in the 
search for year-round harbors. Victoria asserts that this world view 
was identical to that of the government of Japan, a view used to jus-
tify the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), then the annexation of 
the Korean peninsula (1910) and the founding of the puppet state of 
Manchukuo (1932). Victoria’s assertion, and his implicit criticism 
of Makiguchi, simplistically links analysis of the global situation 
with the policies taken in response to that. Makiguchi was merely 
voicing what was then the accepted understanding of the geopoliti-
cal motives for Russia’s expansionist policies, a view held not only 
by the Japanese government, but shared by the British, with whom 
Japan had formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Certainly I know 
of no scholar of political geography who rejects this commonsense 
view in favor of one that Russia posed no danger. If we were to 
extend Victoria’s argument, the logical conclusion would be to find 
not only Makiguchi but everyone who studies political geography 
guilty of complicity with Japanese aggression.22 
Similarly, it is hardly surprising that those who sought to justify Japan’s 
invasive wars would use arguments “paralleling” Suzuki’s attempts to define 
the legitimate use of force, since those who support any war always endeavor 
to present that war as just. Any apparent connection between Suzuki’s posi-
tion and that of the pro-war Buddhist leaders is superficial, since Suzuki was 
22 Miyata 2002, p. 80.
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making a philosophical case for war to defend the nation from an invading 
force, while the Buddhist leaders were supporting what was clearly a war of 
aggression abroad. One can argue for the existence of certain circumstances 
in which armed resistance is just, and without contradiction strongly oppose 
wars that do not fit those conditions. In Suzuki’s case, the issue thus becomes, 
not whether he expressed ideas that “paralleled” or “were similar to” the 
ideas expressed by war supporters, but what his actual views were regarding 
Japan’s military and its wars.
Writings Prior to Pearl Harbor
Despite Victoria’s efforts to portray Suzuki as an important militarist thinker, 
it quickly becomes apparent from a review of Suzuki’s writings that mili-
tary issues were not of major interest to him. In the vast body of writing he 
produced, filling forty volumes in the newest edition of the Suzuki Daisetsu 
zenshū 鈴木大拙全集 (Collected Works of D. T. Suzuki), there is remarkably 
little material relating to the subject of war. There are several general articles 
on the topic, in which, as we have seen, Suzuki recognizes the persistent real-
ity of war in the course of human history; there are his writings on Bushido, 
in which Suzuki describes the ethical ideals of the feudal Japanese warrior; 
and there are a number of explicit (and overwhelmingly negative) references 
to war in his journal articles, private letters, and recorded talks.
It is important first to note that Suzuki was not without patriotic senti-
ment—on several occasions, for example, he mentions favorably the fortitude 
and valor with which the Japanese soldiery acquitted itself during the Russo-
Japanese War. Suffice it to say that support for one’s country’s soldiers does 
not necessarily mean support for the wars they are fighting in—even in the 
case of the present Iraq War, few of the many American opponents I know are 
critical of the ordinary troops who are in combat there. In any event, a review 
of his writings quickly shows that Suzuki’s sympathy for the ordinary soldier 
did not extend to the military establishment, the ideologies it supported, or the 
wars it engaged in. 
Within two years of Japan’s victorious conclusion of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1895, and within six months of publishing A New Theory of Religion 
and departing Japan for America, Suzuki was already writing letters to friends 
critical of State Shinto. This is a standpoint that hardly would have aligned 
him with the right-wing forces, and, coming so soon after the publication of A 
New Theory of Religion, further suggests that this book was not written with 
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nationalist goals in mind. On 13 June 1897, Suzuki wrote as follows to the 
owner of the publishing house Baiyō Shoin 貝葉書院:
In our country an increasing number of people are promoting reli-
gion. Among the various attempts to satisfy the religious spirit is 
something called “New Shinto” that advocates a kind of national-
ism. While it is laudable that religion is at last gaining the attention 
of the general populace, I have my reservations about this “New 
Shinto” as a religion. First of all, there appear to be some hidden 
motives behind the fact that it takes a position distinct from that 
of religious philosophy and ethics. If we do not now take up these 
motives for consideration, I think our efforts to discuss [this New 
Shinto] will come to nothing. To conclude, it seems that these 
people have yet to arrive at a deep understanding of the depths of 
the human heart.23
This letter demonstrates that Suzuki’s reservations about the new forms of 
Shinto, and his belief that it did not represent a genuine system of spirituality, 
had their beginnings quite early in his life, and were not, as Victoria asserts, 
acquired only with the decline of Japan’s wartime fortunes in the 1940s.24 
Suzuki’s critical comments on the emerging power of the nationalist forces 
was not confined to his private correspondence. In 1898, a year after he wrote 
the letter quoted above, the following comments appeared in an article pub-
lished in the journal Rikugō zasshi 六合雑誌:
They say, “Obey the rescripts on the Imperial Restoration,” “Study 
the Imperial Rescript on Education,” “Display a nation-building 
spirit,” “Honor the ancestors of the country.” All of this is fine. 
But while these people on the one hand proclaim reason as their 
supreme sword and shield and talk continually of the results of 
nineteenth-century historical research, on the other hand they 
manipulate the weaknesses of the Japanese people, embracing the 
23 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 90.
24 Victoria, discussing Suzuki’s postwar stance on Buddhist war support writes: “Suzuki spoke 
again of his own moral responsibility for the war in The Spiritualizing of Japan (Nihon no Rei-
seika), published in 1947. This book is a collection of five lectures that he had given at the Shin 
sect-affiliated Ōtani University in Kyoto during the month of June 1946. The focus of his talks 
was Shinto, for by this time he had decided that Shinto was to blame for Japan’s militaristic 
past. According to Suzuki, Shinto was a ‘primitive religion’ that ‘lacked spirituality’” (Victoria 
1997, p. 150).
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imperial family and the imperial rescripts and attempting to imbue 
them with a religious significance. The hypocrisy of it all is quite 
overwhelming. . . .
Let us stop pretending that the Japanese are a great people merely 
because their imperial family has continued unbroken for the past 
2,500 years.25 
Suzuki expanded on these themes in a letter to his good friend Yamamoto 
Ryōkichi 山本良吉 (1871–1942), in a letter dated 14 June 1898:
It seems to me that the imperial household still clings to the dream 
of its ancient days of transcendence and sanctity, while the Japanese 
people think there is nothing more wonderful than the imperial 
rescripts and believe that modern progress will bring about no ben-
efit. For that reason, when the government encounters a situation 
unfavorable to itself it quickly tries to hide behind such attitudes 
and silence the voice of the people. Moreover, because of this the 
people find the path of free thought cut off to them. We are obliged 
to obey those who exalt the imperial household and shield them-
selves with the imperial rescripts. This is extremely unreasonable. 
(In the margin: These words must never be made public, I must 
wait for the right time.) Recent attempts to dress up utilitarian ide-
ologies like Japanese nationalism in the clothes of the emperor and 
foist them on us remind me of the Buddhist bonzes in the ancient 
capital of Nara who would take advantage of the Shinto mikoshi in 
their rituals. Kimura’s Kokkyōron26 (The Japanese Nationalist State 
Religion) is wild in the extreme; even if the nationalists have a few 
points of interest to make, seeing the distorted utilitarian arguments 
they use, no one would be tempted to pay them any attention.27 
A few weeks after this letter was written, an article appeared in the Rikugō zasshi, 
the journal quoted above, showing that Suzuki was not only critical of the ideol-
ogy and political maneuvering of the rightists, but was also positively inclined to 
socialist thought, further distancing him from the nationalist thinkers:
25 SDZ, vol. 30, pp. 130–31. The article originally appeared as “Tabi no tsurezure” 旅のつれ
づれ (Random thoughts while traveling) in Rikugō zasshi 20 (25 June 1898), pp. 70–72. The 
translation here relies on Kirita 1994, p. 54. 
26 Suzuki is referring to the book Nihon shugi kokkyōron 日本主義国教論, a nativist work by 
Kimura Takatarō 木村鷹太郎.
27 SDZ, vol. 36, pp. 151–52. Cf. Kirita 1994, pp. 54–55. 
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It is said that the government has forbidden the formation of the 
Social Democratic Party. I deeply regret the Japanese government’s 
irresponsibility and lack of farsightedness, and its inattentiveness to 
social progress and human happiness.28
Suzuki writes on socialism in greater detail in letters he sent in early 1901 to 
Yamamoto. The subject is mentioned in two interesting letters, also cited by 
Victoria in a recent article.29 The first is dated 6 January 1901:
Lately I have had a desire to study socialism, for I am sympathetic 
to its views on social justice and equality of opportunity. Present-
day society (including Japan, of course) must be reformed from the 
ground up.30 
No more than a week later, on 14 January 1901, Suzuki wrote as follows:
In recent days I have become a socialist sympathizer to an extreme 
degree. However, my socialism is not based on economics but reli-
gion. This said, I am unable to publicly advocate this doctrine to 
the ordinary people because they are so universally querulous and 
illiterate and therefore unprepared to listen to what I have to say. 
However, basing myself on socialism, I intend to gradually incline 
people to my way of thinking though I also believe I need to study 
some sociology.31 
These ideas and outlooks were reflected in some of Suzuki’s public writ-
ings at this time. For example, the following passage appears in the article 
“Shakai kyūsai ron” 社会救済論 (On Social Relief) in 1904:
When we look for the reasons for the plight of the impoverished 
in today’s society, we see that their poverty is due not so much to 
any fault of their own as to the defects of the social system and the 
maldistribution of wealth. . . . One can hardly expect impoverished 
28 SDZ, vol. 30, p. 265. The article originally appeared as “Shakai minshuteki tō no kettō kinshi 
ni tsukite (Shakai shugi no shūkyōteki kiso)” 社会民主的党の結党禁止につきて（社会主義の宗
教的基礎） (On the Prohibition of the Formation of the Social Democratic Party: The Religious 
Foundations of Socialism) in Rikugō zasshi 249 (15 September 1901), pp. 43–47; This transla-
tion appeares in Kirita 1994, p. 56.
29 Victoria 2007.
30 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 204. This translation relies on Victoria 2007.
31 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 206. This translation relies on Victoria 2007.
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people in such difficult circumstances to be satisfied with spiritual 
comfort bereft of any material aid. . . . My earnest desire is that 
Buddhists do not remain satisfied with personal peace and enlight-
enment but take it upon themselves to help society.32
In a letter to Yamamoto in 1903 (exact date unknown), Suzuki criticizes 
the nationalist direction taken by the Ministry of Education in words that are 
surprisingly strong:
What is this unbelievable childishness that is going on, as with that 
recent affair at Tetsugakkan 哲学館 University?33 Looking at the 
situation from where I am now here in the United States, I can only 
conclude that our Ministry of Education’s behavior is sheer lunacy. 
What is all this about “loyalty”? What is all this about “national 
polity”? Do these things have any more worth than a baby’s rattle? 
Viewed from this shore,34 it seems such a farce, both the govern-
ment officials that brandish these concepts as though they were 
Masamune swords35 and the public that attempts to avoid trouble 
by conveniently ignoring the issues, as in the saying, “Don’t pro-
voke the gods and you won’t be punished.” Of course you, living 
there in Japan, probably think I’m overstating things. In any event, 
these government people lack any democratic spirit, and their 
claims that they represent the emperor, that the emperor himself is a 
god-man superior to ordinary human beings, and that “loyalty” con-
sists of following his orders or some such thing, are utterly absurd. 
Fortunately the present Japanese emperor is a man of good sense 
and does not attempt to interfere in the government. If, when the 
crown prince accedes to the throne, he tries like the present German 
32 SDZ, vol. 30, pp. 339–40. This translation relies on Kirita 1994, p. 56. The article originally 
appeared in the journal Beikoku bukkyō 米國佛教 5, no. 1, pp. 8–10.
33 The Tetsugakkan Affair refers to an incident involving the private university Tetsugakkan 
(present Tōyō University). In 1902 the Ministry of Education took exception to one of the 
university’s final examination questions, which the Ministry regarded as constituting lèse 
majesté against the emperor. Despite a public outcry against the Ministry for what was regarded 
as a blatant interference in academic freedom, the university was stripped of its right to license 
middle school teachers.
34 I.e., the United States.
35 The swords made by the smith Okazaki Masamune 岡崎正宗 (ca. thirteenth to fourteenth 
centuries) are regarded as the finest examples of Japanese sword making. 
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emperor to run things and force the people to obey him in the name 
of “loyalty to the ruler,” it isn’t difficult to imagine the result.36 
After the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s first armed 
conflict after the publication of A New Theory of Religion, none of the jin-
goistic spirit that Victoria accusses the young Suzuki of is seen in his cor-
respondence with Yamamoto. In a letter dated 1 October 1904 he laments the 
sacrifices involved and expresses concerns about the intentions of both sides:
Is this war dragging on? I can hardly bring myself to read the daily 
newspaper reports of the tragic situation at Port Arthur. Both sides 
are prepared to fight to the death in battle, and it seems they will 
not quit till they have all killed each other. I am sad at the loss of so 
many promising young Japanese soldiers and sympathize with the 
suffering of the innocent Russian peasantry. Is there not some way 
to come to a settlement? It is tragic to see that the enemy govern-
ment, as a totalitarian monarchy, intends to fight till it collapses 
from exhaustion.37 
A letter dated 1 December 1904 continues in the same vein, with criticism of 
the Japanese government:
When reporting the progress of the war, the Japanese government 
exaggerates the victories and either remains silent on the defeats 
or downplays them as much as possible. They treat the populace 
like fools. [Protecting] military secrets is one thing, but other news 
should be handled in an aboveboard fashion that shows trust in the 
populace. It is deplorable that [the government] has been unable 
to do this. I mentioned this matter to a Japanese who was staying 
here for several days, but he stubbornly agreed with the actions of 
the Japanese government. If such support exists even among edu-
cated Japanese, then one must conclude that the progress of politi-
cal thought in Japan is still lagging. What do you think? Japanese 
politics appears to be exceedingly complex and very annoying in its 
meddlesome intrusions. If I had to return to Japan suddenly I think 
I might find it terribly confining.38
36 SDZ, vol. 36, pp. 238–39.
37 Ibid., pp. 254–55.
38 Ibid., p. 256.
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As the war progressed and the Japanese military achieved a string of victo-
ries, Suzuki, in a letter dated 2 February 1905, continues to refrain from praise 
for the war itself while expressing hope that the successes and the valor shown 
by the Japanese forces would brighten Japan’s outlook and offset to some 
extent the conflict’s terrible burdens and losses. Regarding the war itself his 
emphasis is on the importance of continued diplomatic initiatives. 
Japan’s success in the war appears not to have changed Suzuki’s critical 
attitude toward the military itself, however. In 1910, just a year after his return 
from his ten-year stay abroad and less than five years after the end of the war, 
Suzuki wrote an essay, “Ryokuin mango” 緑陰漫語 (Idle Talk in the Shade of a 
Tree), published in the journal Shin bukkyō, in which he expresses dismay at 
the rising status of the Japanese armed forces:
The dominance of the military, perhaps as a result of the Sino-Japa-
nese and Russo-Japanese Wars, is something I don’t feel entirely 
comfortable with. In America the closest thing I saw to a military 
uniform was the outfit worn by hotel bellboys. Crossing the sea to 
England, I saw a few soldiers around, but nothing really noticeable. 
Moving on to France and Germany, I first observed great military 
organizations backed by the entire nation, and I believe the situation 
is pretty much the same in Russia. However, I have been most struck 
by this type of thing in Japan, following my return. This is partly 
because I am more familiar with the situation in my own country, of 
course, and because of the numerous opportunities I have to notice 
the military’s ascendancy. Nevertheless, the sort of unease I feel 
about this is something I would have felt anywhere. I don’t know 
what those who have gained prominence by becoming military men 
may think of the matter, but as for myself I can’t help feeling that 
these military people are receiving far more preferential treatment 
than they deserve. Even from a purely objective standpoint, I do not 
think this overindulgence of the military is to be celebrated as far as 
the future of the country is concerned. If one emphasizes one thing 
then the tendency is to undervalue another. In other words, if you 
devote too many resources to the military then you can easily end 
up depriving education of the resources it needs.39 
39 SDZ, vol. 30, pp. 407–8. A similar distaste for the military is reflected in a later report by a 
student of Suzuki, who recalls that during WWII, when he called upon Suzuki at his home near 
Otani University dressed in his army officer’s uniform with his sword by his side, Suzuki was 
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In 1914, following the beginning of WWI in Europe, Suzuki wrote an essay 
in which he first of all expresses a clear aversion to the human and cultural 
sacrifices that war invariably involves, then steers the discussion in a spiritual 
direction, using war as a symbol for the struggle against one’s own inner 
enemies.
Zen and War
Suppose someone were to ask, “What is the opinion of a Zen person 
on the present Great War [WWI]?” The Zen man would answer: “I 
have no particular opinion, and in particular I have no opinion as a 
Zen person.” A Zen person is no different from others, having two 
eyes and two legs and a head just like everyone else; there is noth-
ing that sets him apart from other human beings. Thus when it gets 
cold he feels the cold, when it gets hot he feels the heat; when he 
sees the autumn moon he fully admires the pale moonlight, when 
he sees the pink blossoms of springtime he is moved with emotion. 
With regard to war, as well as peace, as far as his thoughts go there 
is not an iota of difference with how other humans regard it. How-
ever combative Zen people may seem because of their shouting 
and stick-wielding, just show them a mound of corpses or a river of 
flowing blood and not one of them will celebrate war. 
This is precisely the way I feel. The development, advancement, 
and perfection of our inner capabilities, which may be regarded as 
the most essential task of our lives, can be effectively accomplished 
only during times of peace. When peace is lost and people start 
shooting and slashing at their neighbors, the world becomes the 
realm of the asuras40 and the Demon King prevails. As long as 
hostilities continue, the flowering of the humanities, the progress 
of science, the happiness of the individual, and the enjoyment of 
family life are all like spring blossoms carried off by the wind. War 
instantly turns heaven into hell and transforms bodhi into delusion. 
How could a Zen man assent to it? 
Thus as to the impressions of the Zen man regarding the present 
tragic situation, they are the same as the impressions of teachers, 
visibly unhappy. Standing at the entrance, Suzuki said, “Don’t come here dressed up like some 
kind of toy. Come back after you’ve changed into something else, even if it’s just a nemaki [a 
light kimono for sleeping]” (Kitanishi 2007, p. 118).
40 The asura (Jpn. ashura 阿修羅) is a fighting deity, or a titan.
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of those who love the humanities, of those who celebrate progress, 
of merchants, of farmers, of scientists, and of statesmen. It is mis-
guided to inquire about the impressions of Zen people in particular, 
as if they formed a separate category. . . .
But if I were to comment on the Great War just as an ordinary 
person, it seems to me to represent a major blow against, or break-
down and failure of, Occidental Christian civilization. War itself is 
already irreligious in nature, so once the social order breaks down 
the restraints that had prevailed till then are quickly lost, and soon 
we see scenes straight from the age of barbarism. How shameful it 
is that the naked human heart can be so brutal. . . .
Speaking of war, it strikes me that a person’s life itself is like an 
ongoing war. Whenever we’re even the slightest bit careless the 
enemy uses that gap to attack. Thus every day, in each and every 
instant, we must persevere in our watchfulness, our cultivation, and 
our practice, or the foundations of our moral and religious life will 
be overturned. It is just as in actual combat—if for a while we get 
the upper hand and let down our guard as a result, then the source of 
our destruction will rush through that opening without a moment’s 
delay. Moreover, the enemy being very secretive about its route of 
entry, it is exceedingly difficult to spy it out. Thus the moment of 
carelessness itself equals the enemy’s attack. If, relying on the bit of 
Zen insight you might have gained, you allow yourself to become 
unaware, that insight will vanish as though dropped from your 
hand. Why would this apply only to Zen training?
Zen people have no set view with regard to war, or at least I as 
an individual do not. If there is such an outlook, it applies only to 
the type of inner battle that I have described. Given the present 
nature of civilization, given the present nature of the human mind, 
and given the present nature of international relations, it is only to 
be expected that wars will occur, so what can one say about such 
a matter? However, I would ask each and every one of you not to 
forget that when you fight the enemies in your own mind you must 
do so to win.41 
During the 1930s—a time when the Japanese militarists were consolidating 
their power and right-wing thought was ascendant—several of Suzuki’s letters 
41 SDZ, vol. 30, pp. 480–82.
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to Yamamoto indicate that the interest in socialist principles he first expressed 
thirty years earlier had continued throughout the ensuing decades, along with 
his dissatisfaction with the direction the government was heading in. In a 
postscript to a letter dated 21 February 1930, he writes:
I cast my vote for Kawakami. I have just got the news that he lost. 
The ruling party candidates are all no good. In any event, it is ben-
eficial to have a number of candidates from the Proletariat Party 
running, though not too many.42
A letter dated 16 October 1935 indicates that Suzuki’s interest was not 
merely intellectual, but concrete enough for him to actively intervene on 
behalf of people with a leftist outlook:
Is there no one whom you know in the Tokyo Police Department? 
There is a someone I know who has been incarcerated at Yodobashi 
on the grounds of having leftist tendencies (I hear he has been trans-
ferred from place to place after that). I’d like to find out if there is 
any way to trace his whereabouts, and possibly to gain his quick 
release. Please let me know if there is some way to do this.43 
Although this hardly rates as a major act of defiance against the government, 
it still demonstrates a decidedly non-rightist outlook, in addition to consider-
able integrity at a time when thousands suspected of leftist sympathies were 
being arrested and interrogated by the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Kōtō 
Keisatsu 特別高等警察, commonly known as the “thought police”).
The next example of Suzuki’s writing that I would like to examine is from 
an English essay published in Suzuki’s Essays in Zen Buddhism, Third Series. 
It does not directly relate to the subject of war but is of interest for what it says 
about Victoria’s use of the sources. In Zen at War, Victoria describes the Shin 
Buddhist missionary efforts on the Asian continent, concluding that the “mis-
sionary efforts of the Shin sect . . . actually preceded the Japanese military’s 
advance. This practice emerged as a result of the vision of Meiji-era leaders 
such as Ogurusu Kōchō [小栗栖香頂] and Okumura Enshin [奥村円心], who 
advocated using Buddhism as the basis for forming an anti-Western alliance 
42 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 536. Kawakami Hajime (1879–1946) was a member of the Musan Seitō 
Nihon Rōnō Seitō 無産政党日本労農政党 (Japanese Labor and Farm Proletarian Party ).
43 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 615. Yamamoto was at this time a “high level civil servant” (kōtōkan 高等
官), and would have had friends in the mid-ranks of government.
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between Japan, China, and India.” Victoria continues:
D.T. Suzuki also shared this ideology, as demonstrated by an essay 
on Zen he published in English in 1934, in which he wrote:
If the East is one and there is something that differentiates it 
from the West, the differentia must be sought in the thought 
that is embodied in Buddhism. For it is in Buddhist thought and 
in no other that India, China, and Japan representing the East, 
could be united as one. . . . When the East as unity is made to 
confront the West, Buddhism supplies the bond.
Such ideas provided one of the ideological underpinnings for the 
subsequent development of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” (Dai Tōa Kyōei Ken), Japan’s rationalization for its aggres-
sion in Asia.44 
It is instructive to consider the entire, unexcerpted passage from which Vic-
toria quotes:
If the East is one, and there is something that differentiates it from 
the West, the differentia must be sought in the thought that is embod-
ied in Buddhism. For it is in Buddhist thought and in no other that 
India, China, and Japan representing the East, could be united as 
one. Each nationality has its own characteristic modes of adopting 
the thought to its environmental needs, but when the East as unity 
is made to confront the West, Buddhism supplies the bond. What 
then are those central ideas of Buddhism which sweep over Asia 
and which have been asserting themselves either openly or covertly 
in Japan? They are the immanent conception of Buddha-nature, the 
transcendentality of Prajñā, (intuitive knowledge), the all-embrac-
ing compassion and the eternal vows of the Bodhisattva.45
It is quite clear when this passage is read in full (and especially when read in 
the context of the chapter, a short overview of the development of Japanese 
Buddhism) that Suzuki is not advocating “using Buddhism as the basis for 
forming an anti-Western alliance,” but simply stating that, if there is a certain 
unity to be discerned in the cultures of India, China, and Japan as opposed to 
44 Victoria 1997, pp. 64–65. The quoted passage may be found in Suzuki 1970, p. 378.
45 Suzuki 1970, p. 378. 
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the major cultures of the West, then that unity is provided by Buddhism. This 
is hardly a problematic statement, given that Buddhism is the only system 
of thought shared by all three cultures. Nowhere in his writing does Suzuki 
advocate an anti-Western alliance. Although he believed that there was much 
of value in the East that was deserving of preservation, he was equally aware 
of the East’s shortcomings, and he strongly urged—even during the Second 
World War, as we shall see later in this article—that Japan maintain a positive 
attitude toward what it could gain from the West.46 
Returning to Suzuki’s writings more directly related to the war, there were 
in the first years of the 1940s several further letters from Suzuki to Yamamoto 
showing that Suzuki’s dissatisfaction with the government had deepened, and 
that he had strong reservations about the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–
1945). In a letter dated 10 February 1940, nearly two years before the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, Suzuki writes:
They can talk if they like about the national polity, the function 
of the emperor, and the unity of Shinto and government, but the 
embodiment of these concepts is nil—utterly without substance. 
The same is true of the New Order in East Asia, which has come 
to nothing. The people were just spurred on and sacrificed to the 
ideology of certain government leaders. We’ll be lucky if there’s 
not a civil war. Those of us on the home front—to say nothing of 
the soldiers on the battlefields—have suffered for this ten-thousand 
times over. It is the deplorable truth that Japan today hasn’t a single 
statesman. We must start preparing for twenty years in the future; 
the responsibility of those in charge of education is great.47 
Suzuki laments the lack of statesmen once again a year later, in a letter dated 
13 February 1941:
Indeed, thinking about it, there is much about Japan’s future pros-
pects that chills the heart. The most worrisome thing is that there 
are no real statesmen. I can’t bear seeing the dominance of this 
boisterous bunch [in government] lacking in any kind of philo-
sophical vision.48 
46 For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Ueda 2007.
47 SDZ, vol. 37, p. 2.
48 SDZ, vol. 37, p. 17.
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Six months prior to Pearl Harbor, in a letter dated 8 August 1941 to a former 
student, the socialist novelist Iwakura Masaji 岩倉政治 (1903–2000), Suzuki 
writes:
It is unfortunate that the authorities will not grant you permission to 
publish your book. I know how disappointed you must feel. Keep in 
mind, however, that some years from now publication will become 
possible, so be patient until such a time comes. This war is certain 
to take Japan to the brink of destruction—indeed, we can say that 
we are already there. The leaders of Japan cannot continue this fight 
forever; in their innermost minds they are deeply conflicted, and 
until this is taken care of there will be no betterment of the country’s 
fortunes. The New Order in East Asia was certain to fail before 
anything came of it. We must accept the consequences49 of what 
we have done as a nation—there is nothing we can do about it now. 
I must put off telling you my frank opinion of the situation until we 
meet directly. History attests to the dangers of entrusting the affairs 
of a nation to people with no religious convictions; is this not what 
Japan is dealing with right now?50 
It was at just around this time that there appeared in Japanese several 
articles on the subject of Bushido 武士道, the Japanese “Way of the Warrior.” 
Since this subject plays a central part in Victoria’s critique of Suzuki, I would 
like to consider this complex and interesting issue at some length. 
Bushido
Let us begin by examining Victoria’s treatment of a 1941 article by Suzuki 
entitled “Zen to bushidō” 禅と武士道 (hereafter “Zen and Bushido”), an essay 
appearing in a book entitled Bushidō no shinzui 武士道の神髄 (The Essence of 
Bushido), together with a number of articles written by political and military 
figures. Although this article was not his earliest treatment of Bushido, having 
been predated by several 1938 English-language essays on the subject, it is of 
interest since it touches on several issues related to Victoria’s critique. 
Victoria characterizes Suzuki as a central figure in the compilation of this 
publication:
49 The word Suzuki uses is gōhō 業報, which has a nuance of karmic retribution.
50 SDZ, vol. 37, pp. 25–26.
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Less than one month before Pearl Harbor, on November 10, 1941, 
[Suzuki] joined hands with such military leaders as former army 
minister and imperial army general Araki Sadao (1877–1966), 
imperial navy captain Hirose Yutaka, and others to publish a book 
entitled The Essence of Bushido (Bushidō no Shinzui).51 
Aside from stressing that “the connection of this book to the goals and pur-
poses of the imperial military was unmistakable,” Victoria says very little 
about Suzuki’s article, acknowledging that it was simply “a fourteen-page dis-
tillation of his earlier thought. It did not cover any new intellectual ground.” 
Instead, Victoria focuses on a statement by the collection’s editor, Handa Shin 
半田信, that “Dr. Suzuki’s writings are said to have strongly influenced the 
military spirit of Nazi Germany,” and further insinuates a link between Suzuki 
and Nazism by quoting a speech mentioning Bushido (but not Suzuki) given 
by Kurusu Saburō, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, on the occasion of 
the formation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy. 
Does the fact that Suzuki wrote on Bushido, and that Bushido thought influ-
enced the German military spirit, mean that Suzuki was an active supporter of 
Nazi ideology? No more, I would venture, than the fact that Victoria critiques 
Zen, and the fact that several Fundamentalist Christian websites I have seen in 
the past have utilized those critiques in their attacks on Buddhism, means that 
Victoria is an active supporter of Fundamentalist Christian ideology. Here, 
too, Victoria’s argument is based entirely on guilt by association. 
Although Victoria implies that Suzuki actively participated with militarist 
leaders in the publication of this work, Suzuki was involved only to the extent 
of permitting publication of his essay “Zen and Bushido,” which was not even 
written for Bushidō no shinzui but was a reprint of a piece that had appeared 
ten months earlier in the February 1941 issue of the journal Gendai 現代 (The 
Modern Age). Moreover, the article, as Victoria notes, is simply an essay set-
ting forth Suzuki’s thought on Bushido in general; it contains no mention of 
the ongoing war in Asia, nor any suggestion that Suzuki supported it. Such 
silence is hardly what one would expect if its author had been a committed 
proponent of the conflict, since the article would have provided a perfect venue 
for voicing such support, support that Suzuki would have had nothing to lose 
and everything to gain by expressing. Popular opinion would have been with 
him, as would the weight of opinion in the Japanese Buddhist world. And with 
much of the Zen intelligentsia at the time writing articles backing the nation’s 
51 Victoria 1997, p. 110.
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wartime policies, a well-known figure like Suzuki must have faced consider-
able pressure, both subtle and overt, to conform. Instead, here as elsewhere in 
his writings on Bushido, he confined his discussion to the subject itself and 
remained silent on Japan’s contemporary military situation.52 
Insofar as Suzuki’s work on Bushido relates to martial issues it is easy, of 
course, to link them to Japan’s modern wars, and for this very reason it is 
important to examine them in the context of Suzuki’s overall views on war, 
the military, and political ideology. As we have seen from Suzuki’s public 
writings and private letters, two basic positions characterize his thought on 
these subjects. The first is a recognition of the reality of aggression in human 
history, and of the consequent legitimacy of defensive war under certain con-
ditions. The second is a clear antipathy toward the Japanese military establish-
ment and its activities—a statement, in effect, that Japan’s modern military 
conflicts did not meet the conditions he set for justifiable war. This extends, 
as we have seen, to the 1930s war with China (Victoria presents what he con-
siders to be evidence for support of this war, evidence that we will consider 
below). I believe that a full consideration of Suzuki’s writings on Bushido 
show that they were in accord with these positions.
It should be noted first of all that although Bushido was obviously a subject 
of interest to Suzuki, appearing in a number of his writings on Zen, feudal 
samurai culture, and Japanese society, he was not, contrary to Victoria’s 
assertions,53 a major figure in the development or dissemination of Bushido 
thought. For one thing, the militarists hardly needed Suzuki to formulate a 
Bushido ideology for them. Bushido was already central to Japanese military 
culture from at least the Tokugawa period (1600–1868),54 by which time it 
constituted an important aspect of Japanese feudal law. Bushido was thor-
oughly familiar to the modern Japanese army officer corps from the time of 
the Meiji Restoration, composed as it was primarily of former members or 
descendents of the feudal warrior class. More importantly, Suzuki’s writings 
on Bushido comprised a relatively minor portion of his entire body of work, 
and came quite late in his career as a writer. Although mentions of Bushido 
are found in several of his early works,55 his first systematized writings on 
52 Suzuki did express the opinion that some of the samurai spirit lived in the modern Japanese 
soldier (e.g., Suzuki 1959, p. 85), an opinion that surely any of the armies fighting Japan would 
have concurred with. What Suzuki’s writings show, both prior to and during WWII, is that what 
he disagreed with was the way in which the military establishment was using that spirit.
53 See Victoria 1997, pp. 111–12, particularly p. 112.
54 See, for example, Henshall 1999, pp. 56–60.
55 For example, a one-paragraph mention in Suzuki 1906–7, p. 34. 
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the subject appeared in Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture, 
a collection of essays that was published in 1938, when Suzuki was nearly 
seventy years old. As an English-language work the book was, of course, 
directed toward a Western readership, hardly an audience that Suzuki would 
have chosen had he been seeking fertile ground for the promotion of ideas 
useful to Japanese militarism. Nor did Suzuki produce a Japanese edition, 
although he was the logical person to do so (the translation that appeared 
in 1940, two years after the work’s appearance in English, was done not by 
Suzuki himself but a professor of art history named Kitagawa Momo’o 北川桃
雄 [1899–1969]). The 1941 article “Zen and Bushido,” is, as far as I can deter-
mine, Suzuki’s first full Japanese-language essay specifically on Bushido, and 
also one of the last.
Thus Suzuki’s prewar and wartime writings on Bushido were pretty much 
confined to the period between 1938 and the early 1940s, by which time the 
die was long since cast for Japanese militarist ideology and the Japanese 
military itself was already well on its course toward disaster in Asia and the 
Pacific—a disaster that Suzuki saw coming, judging by his letters in 1940 and 
1941 to Yamamoto and Iwakura. Why, at this of all times, would Suzuki have 
started writing on the subject of Bushido? Although all attempts to answer 
this question must remain conjecture, I would like to propose a possibility 
that at least has the merit of consistency with Suzuki’s opposition to modern 
Japanese militarism as expressed in his letters and non-Bushido writings, an 
essential body of evidence that Victoria excludes from his analysis. 
As mentioned above, if one recognizes the fact that invasive wars have 
occurred throughout human history and that therefore defensive action is 
occasionally unavoidable, then it is essential to consider the conditions under 
which fighting is justifiable (jus ad bellum) and the manner in which fighting 
must be carried out in order to be justifiable (jus in bellum; if one is a Bud-
dhist, this means considering in particular how to conduct combat in a way 
that minimizes contravention of the principle of nonviolence). The effort to 
define these issues inevitably involves an unsatisfactory compromise between 
realism and idealism, particularly in the case of Buddhism, since violence is 
always a part of war. Nevertheless, the effort to define a just form of combat 
should be seen for what it is: a real-world attempt to minimize the possibility 
of even worse alternatives.
I believe that it was with this in mind that Suzuki, with his long-standing 
misgivings about the modern Japanese military establishment and his aware-
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ness of the way that it was mishandling the war,56 began to write on the 
ideals of Bushido at this difficult juncture in Japan’s history. Victoria’s attack 
on Suzuki relies principally on Suzuki’s main English essays on Bushido, 
“Zen and the Samurai” and “Zen and Swordsmanship (Parts 1 and 2),” in 
Zen and Japanese Culture.57 Although these essays, like Suzuki’s other writ-
ings, contain no expressions of support for Japan’s modern wars, Victoria 
takes selected passages and, through suggestion and juxtaposition, attempts 
to establish a connection with militarist thought. As Victoria’s arguments 
demonstrate, the essays do indeed contain much material that can be utilized 
in this way. I would therefore urge anyone seriously interested in this issue 
to read the full texts, which are after all in English and readily available. I 
believe a full reading reveals that Suzuki’s intention throughout these writings 
was not to encourage conflict, but to stress that the avoidance of conflict was 
at the heart of Bushido.
For example, Suzuki often notes how Bushido, in its stress on “abandon-
ing life and death,” parallels the constant enjoinders heard in Zen training to 
resolve the central problem of samsara. While the Zen monk is motivated 
to face this issue by an inner, existential question, the more down-to-earth 
warrior is compelled to do so by the outer realities of his lifestyle, and the 
dynamic between the two approaches was obviously of interest to Suzuki. 
For Suzuki, however, the emphasis is always on the inner battle with the fear 
of death, for both the samurai and the monk. Although Zen Buddhism and Its 
Influence on Japanese Culture discusses in an abstract manner the importance 
of detachment from death for the samurai seeking to gain victory in battle, 
Suzuki presents no actual examples of samurai utilizing such detachment to 
slay opponents. Quite the contrary—all of the historical exemplars of Bushido 
that Suzuki introduces are figures for whom the mastery of swordsmanship is 
marked by a certain transcendence, a calm maturity of personality that when-
ever possible avoids violence and needless fighting. For example, Suzuki 
relates at some length two stories connected with Tsukahara Bokuden 塚原卜傳 
(1489–1571), one of the greatest swordsmen of his time:
56 In addition in his above-mentioned letters to Yamamoto and Iwakura in 1940 and 1941, it 
appears that Suzuki was aware of the Nanjing Massacre of December 1937 to January 1938 
(see his comments on pp. 112–13, below). It is not clear how he would have learned of this, 
considering the strict censorship in effect during the war; acquaintances in the Japanese or for-
eign diplomatic services may have informed him.
57 Suzuki 1959, pp. 61–85 and 89–214, respectively.
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As Tsukahara Bokuden was . . . one of those swordsmen who really 
understood the mission of the sword not as a weapon of murder but 
as an instrument of spiritual self-discipline, let me cite here the two 
best-known incidents of his life:
When Bokuden was crossing Lake Biwa on a row-boat with 
a number of passengers, there was among them a rough-looking 
samurai, stalwart and arrogant in every possible way. He boasted of 
his skill in swordsmanship, saying he was the foremost man in the 
art. The fellow-passengers were eagerly listening to his blatant talk 
while Bokuden was found dozing as if nothing were going on about 
him. This irritated the braggart very much. He approached Bokuden 
and shook him, saying, “You also carry a pair of swords, why not 
say a word?” Answered Bokuden quietly, “My art is different from 
yours; it consists not in defeating others, but in not being defeated.” 
This incensed him immensely. 
“What is your school then?”
“Mine is known as the mutekatsu school” (which means to defeat 
the enemy “without hands,” that is, without using a sword).
“Why do you then carry a sword yourself?”
“This is meant to do away with selfish motives, and not to kill 
others.”
The man’s anger now knew no bounds, and he exclaimed in a 
most impassioned manner, “Do you really mean to fight me with 
no swords?”
“Why not?” was Bokuden’s answer.
The braggart-samurai called out to the boatman to row towards 
the nearest land. But Bokuden suggested that it would be better to 
go to the island farther off because the mainland might attract peo-
ple who were liable to get somehow hurt. The samurai agreed. The 
boat headed towards the solitary island at some distance. As soon as 
they were near enough, the man jumped off the boat and, drawing 
his sword, was all ready for combat. Bokuden leisurely took off his 
own swords and handed them to the boatman. To all appearances 
he was about to follow the samurai onto the island when Bokuden 
suddenly took the oar away from the boatman, and applying it to 
the land gave a hard back-stroke to the boat. Thereupon the boat 
took a precipitous departure from the island and plunged itself into 
the deeper water safely away from the man. Bokuden smilingly 
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remarked, “This is my no-sword school.”
Another interesting and instructive anecdote is told of Bokuden, 
whose mastery of the art really went beyond mere acquiring pro-
ficiency in sword-play. He had three sons who were all trained in 
swordsmanship. He wanted to test their attainments. He placed a 
little pillow over the curtain at the entrance to his room, and it was 
so arranged that a slight touch on the curtain, when it was raised 
upon entering, would make the pillow fall right on one’s head. 
Bokuden called in the eldest son first. When he approached he 
noticed the pillow on the curtain, so he took it down, and after 
entering he placed it back in the original position. The second son 
was now called in. He touched the curtain to raise it, and as soon as 
he saw the pillow coming down, he caught it in his hands, and then 
carefully put it back where it had been. It was the third son’s turn 
to touch the curtain. He came in brusquely, and the pillow fell right 
on his neck. But he cut it in two with his sword even before it came 
down on the floor. 
Bokuden passed his judgment: “Eldest son, you are well qualified 
for swordsmanship.” So saying, he gave him a sword. To the second 
son he said, “Train yourself yet assiduously.” But the youngest son 
Bokuden most severely reproved, for he was pronounced to be a 
disgrace to his family.58 
Here Suzuki is quite explicit in his message that the highest mastery of the 
art of swordsmanship involves a calm transcendence of pride, anger, and 
violent action. He further emphasized this message when he published Zen 
and Japanese Culture, his revision of Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on 
Japanese Culture.59 He describes the standpoint of a sword master named 
Odagiri Ichiun 小田切一雲 (1630–1706), the chief proponent of the “Sword of 
No-abiding Mind” 無住心剣 school and, in Suzuki’s opinion, one of the most 
deeply Zen-influenced swordsmen that Japan has produced:
58 Suzuki 1938, pp. 51–53. 
59 Although this book, published in 1959, may be regarded as irrelevant to the discussion of 
Suzuki’s prewar and wartime presentation of Bushido, I have taken my cue from Victoria, who 
in his attack on Suzuki uses material from the 1959 Zen and Japanese Culture that is not in the 
1938 Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture (e.g., the passage on the sword of 
life and the sword of death, Victoria 1997, p. 110).
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The perfect swordsman avoids quarreling or fighting. Fighting 
means killing. How can one human being bring himself to kill a fel-
low being? We are all meant to love one another and not to kill. It 
is abhorrent that one should be thinking all the time of fighting and 
coming out victorious. We are moral beings, we are not to lower 
ourselves to the status of animality. What is the use of becoming a 
fine swordsman if he loses his human dignity? The best thing is to 
be a victor without fighting.60 
In Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture, Suzuki also 
relates several episodes relating to the great generals Takeda Shingen 武田信
玄 (1521–1573) and Uesugi Kenshin 上杉謙信 (1530–1578), who, although 
rivals during the Warring States period (ca. 1467–ca. 1573), treated each 
other with magnanimity and respect both on the battlefields and off. Kenshin, 
for example, sends Shingen supplies of salt when he learns that the latter’s 
stores of this precious commodity have run out. Whether these stories are 
historically true is not as relevant here as the fact that Suzuki chooses these 
examples to illustrate his position on Bushido: that the warrior ideal lay in 
avoiding conflict whenever possible, and in acting fairly and magnanimously 
toward others. In short, it appears that, far from extolling Bushido to encour-
age militarism, Suzuki was attempting to reframe it in terms as nonviolent as 
possible. 
Nevertheless, the position of the samurai necessarily entailed the use of the 
weapons that characterized their status, whether as warriors or law enforcers. 
This raises the question of how potentially lethal force fits into the ideals of 
Bushido as presented by Suzuki. This in turn brings up “the sword that kills 
and the sword that gives life,” a concept that is one of the most important (and 
controversial) in Suzuki’s Bushido thought. Let us first look at the paragraph, 
found at the beginning of the chapter “Zen and Swordsmanship,” that intro-
duces the concept:
The sword has thus a double office to perform: to destroy anything 
that opposes the will of its owner and to sacrifice all the impulses 
that arise from the instinct of self-preservation. The one relates 
itself with the spirit of patriotism or sometimes militarism, while 
the other has a religious connotation of loyalty and self-sacrifice. In 
60 Suzuki 1959, p. 132. Ichiun’s ideas are set forth in the book Kenjutsu fushiki hen 剣術不識
篇 (The Unknown in the Art of Swordsmanship), by Kimura Kyūho 木村久甫, a short treatise 
compiled in 1768.
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the case of the former, very frequently the sword may mean destruc-
tion pure and simple, and then it is the symbol of force, sometimes 
devilish force. It must, therefore, be controlled and consecrated by 
the second function. Its conscientious owner is always mindful of 
this truth. For then destruction is turned against the evil spirit. The 
sword comes to be identified with the annihilation of things that lie 
in the way of peace, justice, progress, and humanity. [Zen at War’s 
citation ends here.] It stands for all that is desirable for the spiritual 
welfare of the world at large. It is now the embodiment of life and 
not of death.61 
Here again I believe that Suzuki is doing his best to address a real-world 
dilemma: if war is sometimes unavoidable (or if violent lawbreakers must 
occasionally be stopped), then weapons have to be used. If weapons have to 
be used, than how can they be used in a way that minimizes violence to both 
body and spirit? The passage above reflects Suzuki’s view that the sword itself 
is value-neutral: its use is unjustified and harmful in some situations, necessary 
and beneficial in others, depending upon the circumstances and the purpose 
for which it is employed. Technical skill in its use does not necessarily mean 
that it will be used correctly, for a warrior skilled in technique but immature 
in personality may be tempted to utilize his technique with self-aggrandize-
ment as the goal. This is the realm of the sword of death, a realm that Suzuki, 
significantly, specifically links to patriotism and militarism. Suzuki stresses 
that this aspect of the sword must always be “controlled and consecrated” 
by the ethical principle he symbolically identifies as “the sword of life,” so 
that it is employed only when absolutely necessary and in a manner free of 
hatred. This much would seem to apply to the use of any weapon. Of course, 
in the late 1930s and the early 1940s the Japanese military was most clearly 
not using its weapons in a “controlled and consecrated” way, which, I believe, 
is one of the reasons that Suzuki, aware of this abuse, chose this period to 
write about Bushido, emphasizing in particular the internalization of a code 
of moral behavior:
As something of divinity enters into the making of the sword, its 
owner and user ought also to respond to the inspiration. He ought 
to be a spiritual man, and not an agent of brutality. His mind ought 
to be in unison with the soul which animates the cold surface of 
61 Suzuki 1959, p. 89. Cited in Victoria 1997, pp. 108–9.
98
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  1
the steel. The great swordsmen have never been tired of instilling 
this feeling into the minds of their pupils. When the Japanese say 
that the sword is the soul of the samurai, we must remember all 
that goes with it as I have tried to set forth above, that is: loyalty, 
self-sacrifice, reverence, benevolence, and the cultivation of the 
religious feelings. Here is the true samurai.62 
Important as the cultivation of these virtues is, there is another, more inter-
nal aspect wherein Suzuki saw the meeting point of Bushido and Zen. First 
of all, it should be mentioned that Suzuki’s use of the term “Zen” can be con-
fusing, as he (and many other writers on the subject) tend to use it in several 
different meanings. In Japanese the character for “Zen,” 禅, can mean either 
the practice of meditation (more fully expressed using the word zazen 坐禅), 
the meditative experience itself, or the Mahayana Buddhist religious tradition 
known as the Zen school (Zenshū 禅宗). Zen as Mahayana Buddhism has, of 
course, all of the thought structures associated with that tradition, but it is in 
the sense of meditation and the meditative experience that he uses the word 
“Zen” when he writes:
Zen has no special doctrine or philosophy with a set of concepts 
and intellectual formulas, except that it tries to release one from the 
bondage of birth and death and this by means of certain intuitive 
modes of understanding peculiar to itself. It is, therefore, extremely 
flexible to adapt itself almost to any philosophy and moral doctrine 
as long as its intuitive teaching is not interfered with. It may be 
found wedded to anarchism or fascism, communism or democracy, 
atheism or idealism, or any political or economic dogmatism. It is, 
however, generally animated with a certain revolutionary spirit, 
and when things come to a deadlock which is the case when we 
are overloaded with conventionalism, formalism, and other cognate 
isms, Zen asserts itself and proves to be a destructive force.63 
Suzuki often likes to express his point using language that is a bit on the pro-
vocative side, as is the case here. But the underlying point itself is important. 
The Zen referred to here is the Zen that, with its emphasis on the here-and-
now, “asserts itself and proves to be a destructive force”—destructive, that 
is, of “conventionalism, formalism,” and all other isms that would reduce the 
62 Suzuki 1938, pp. 71–72.
63 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
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meditative experience to a system of ideas and beliefs confined to the limits 
of the human mind; it is thus “destructive” in the sense that all true medita-
tion is destructive. Meditation in this sense is the infinite openness in which 
there is no self and other; it is the mind prior to thought, and thus prior to the 
distinction between good and evil. Being prior to the arising of good and evil 
means also, of course, that it is value-neutral, with all the dangers that accom-
pany this. It can be employed equally for either good or evil; when misused it 
can enable killing unrestrained by pangs of guilt or conscience, but when used 
in conjunction with an ethical system that stresses benevolence, magnanimity, 
and compassion, it can provide an important spiritual foundation to that system 
and help minimize the ego concerns that form “the root of all quarrels and fight-
ings.”64 Hence Suzuki’s constant emphasis on the moral aspect of training.
An approach to understanding Suzuki’s position is provided by another 
passage in Zen and Japanese Culture describing Odagiri Ichiun’s notion of 
the highest attainment in swordsmanship being realization of what Suzuki 
calls “Heavenly Reason” or “Primary Nature”:
Ichiun mentions the thing of first importance for the swordsman’s 
personality. He is to give up all desire for name and gain, all ego-
tism and self-glorification, he is to be in accord with Heavenly Rea-
son and observe the Law of Nature as it is reflected in every one of 
us. . . . One is not to think of achieving a victory over the opponent. 
Let the swordsman disregard from the first what may come out 
of the engagement, let him keep his mind clear of such thoughts. 
For the first principle of swordsmanship is a thorough insight into 
Heavenly Reason, which works out according to the chance cir-
cumstances; the rest is of no concern to the swordsman himself.
When Heavenly Reason is present in us it knows how to behave 
on every occasion: when a man sees fire, his Reason knows at once 
how to use it; when he finds water, it tells him at once what it is 
good for; when he meets a friend, it makes him greet him; when he 
sees a person in a dangerous situation, it makes him go right out to 
his rescue. As long as we are one with it, we never err in our proper 
behavior however variable the situation may be.65 
64 Suzuki 1959, pp. 133–34.
65 Ibid., pp. 173–74. One particularly interesting aspect of Ichiun’s thought is that of the non-
violent outcome in swordsmanship known as ai-nuke 相抜け. Generally when two swordsmen 
of equal ability face each other, the final result is ai-uchi 相打ち, in which both masters strike 
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The position of Ichiun—and of Suzuki in citing him—is that the person 
who has transcended all “desire for name and gain, all egotism and self-glo-
rification” is most naturally able to distinguish those occasions when force is 
justified from those when it is not. The meditative mind is best positioned to 
perceive the true nature of a situation, free from the distorting influences of 
self-interest. The same can be said of the application of force, which is most 
likely to be carried out appropriately when freed from the anger, fear, self-
righteousness, fear of death, and all of the other ego mechanisms that are so 
often at the root of truly violent acts against others, and against oneself.
Suzuki’s prewar writings clearly show that he was opposed to militarism 
and right-wing thought, and that he had grave misgivings about war. We 
will see below that these misgivings continued throughout WWII. But in the 
period Suzuki was writing about Bushido, the war was an undeniable fact that 
had to be dealt with. I believe that Suzuki wrote on Bushido because he saw 
in its ethics and ideals one of the only ways to influence the military to, at 
least, minimize the ongoing violence. Whether this was the optimal approach 
is another question, of course. Suzuki may have felt that it was his only option 
during wartime given the totalitarian nature of the government at the time—a 
sentiment that Ichikawa Hakugen would surely have understood66—but the 
each other simultaneously. With “Sword of No-abiding Mind” masters, however, the result 
is ai-nuke, in which both masters strike simultaneously but the result is a mutual “passing-
through” in which neither gets injured. 
66 Although Ichikawa is described by Victoria as “a Rinzai Zen sect-affiliated priest . . . who had 
gone from staunch supporter to severe critic of Japanese militarism” (Victoria 1997, p. ix), this 
description does not accurately describe Ichikawa’s true situation. Far from being a “staunch 
supporter” of Japanese militarism, Ichikawa had for many years prior to the start of the war 
been a left-wing critic of the military government. Christopher Ives, for example, writes:
Ichikawa was a shy child, naturally intimidated and repulsed by the education he 
received under the imperial education system and “terrified” of the state and the supreme 
commander (emperor) who could order his death. With this disposition he found himself 
increasingly against war and the rhetoric of the kokutai (national polity). . . . Gradually, 
a “humanistic anger toward the evils of society and the state” welled up in him, and his 
lifelong interest in Buddhism, socialism, and anarchism began to crystallize. (Ives 1994, 
pp. 16–17.)
Ishii Kōsei, a professor at Komazawa University, writes: 
Ichikawa Hakugen, who after WWII combined self-criticism with an examination of 
the Buddhist world’s war responsibility, was a man who by his own admission went 
through many changes. At first, speaking from his personal political standpoint of Bud-
dhist-Anarchist-Communism, he was a critic of Buddhist cooperation in the war effort. 
Fearing torture under the Special Higher Police, however, he adopted positions that were 
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potential was clearly present for his writings to be abused by a militarist gov-
ernment already employing Bushido to promote its own goals. If Suzuki is to 
be criticized for anything, it is for being insufficiently aware of the potential 
for misuse associated with stressing the ideals of a warrior code more suited 
to the Warring States period than the modern age. 
One such ideal is makujiki kōzen 驀直向前, rushing determinedly forward 
without looking either backward or sideways. As Suzuki expressed the 
concept in his article “Zen and Bushido”: “The spirit of Bushido is truly to 
abandon this life, neither bragging of one’s achievements, nor complaining 
when one’s talents go unrecognized. It is simply a question of rushing forward 
toward one’s ideal.”67 In the feudal period, when battles were fought between 
samurai armies and involved few noncombatants, makujiki kōzen was not 
only the most effective way to prevail in combat but also raised fewer ethical 
questions than in an age when machine guns and other modern weaponry had 
turned battlefields into slaughtergrounds and civilians were seen as legitimate 
targets of attack. As it was, not long after the publication of his articles on 
Bushido, seeing perhaps that the paradigm of makujiki kōzen was indeed 
being used to urge “Zen-inspired warrior-soldiers to ‘rush forward to one’s 
ideal,’ ignoring everything else including questions of right and wrong,”68 
Suzuki felt compelled to publicly express his opposition to attempts to associ-
ate Zen and makujiki kōzen with meaningless death. The following passage 
appeared in a 1943 article in the Buddhist newspaper Chūgai nippō 中外日報:
Some people think that to die recklessly is Zen. But Zen and death 
are not the same thing. Makujikikōzen does not mean to sit in the 
grip of the hand of death. It is deplorable to think of Zen as a 
purification rite. The Zen understanding of human life is based on 
Mahāyāna Buddhism. Zen without this is not Zen. It isn’t anything 
at all. . . . To regard the foolhardy and senseless sacrifice of one’s 
progressively more ambivalent, until finally he wrote material supportive of the war 
(Ishii 2004, p. 227). 
Ichikawa, in other words, was a long-time opponent of the government who was intimidated 
into cooperation by the authorities. This is not to condemn him—his reaction is quite under-
standable given the coercive powers of the totalitarian authorities, against whom opposition 
would have done little except land him in jail. This is an important point to keep in mind when 
attempting to assess the wartime actions of individuals like Ichikawa or D. T. Suzuki.
67 Suzuki 1943, p. 75. This translation appears in Victoria 1997, p. 111.
68 Victoria 1997, p. 208, n. 15.
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life as Zen is a mish-mash idea. Zen absolutely never teaches one to 
throw one’s life away.69 
That he came to realize the difficulties involved in the practical application 
of this feudal samurai ideal to the realities of modern war is suggested by the 
need he felt to state that “Zen absolutely never teaches one to throw one’s life 
away.” One might draw the same conclusion from the fact that after the early 
1940s he wrote no more on Bushido during the wartime years.
Wartime Statements
Apart from his silence on Bushido after the early 1940s, Suzuki was active as 
an author during all of the war years, submitting to Buddhist journals numer-
ous articles that conspicuously avoided mention of the ongoing conflict. Kirita 
Kiyohide, the Japanese Buddhist perhaps most familiar with the entire body 
of Suzuki’s writing, comments:
During this period one of the journals Suzuki contributed to fre-
quently, Daijōzen [Mahayana Zen], fairly bristled with pro-militarist 
articles. In issues filled with essays proclaiming “Victory in the Holy 
War!” and bearing such titles as “Death Is the Last Battle,” “Certain 
Victory for Kamikaze and Torpedoes,” and “The Noble Sacrifice of 
a Hundred Million,” Suzuki continued with contributions on sub-
jects like “Zen and Culture.”
A further indication of his posture during the war years is his 
work for the Buddhist newspaper Chūgai nippō. Between 1941 and 
the end of the war in 1945 Suzuki contributed two regular articles 
and 191 short installments for a column entitled “Zen.” Virtually 
none of these pieces contain any reference to the current politi-
cal and war situation. Instead, they simply introduce the lives and 
recorded sayings of the masters or explain the outlook of Zen.70 
In his private correspondence, however, Suzuki continued to express the 
same standpoint of opposition to the ongoing military developments seen in 
his earlier letters. A letter dated 28 February 1942, just a few months after the 
attacks on Pearl Harbor and Singapore that ignited the war against the Western 
Allies, expresses Suzuki’s anger at the situation in a series of waka poems to 
69 SDZ, vol. 15, p. 224. This translation appears in Kirita 1994, p. 61. 
70 Kirita 1994, pp. 60–61. Reference to SDZ, vol. 15, pp. 157–425.
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his friend Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945):
The glint of the sacred sword appears blinding. 
Nevertheless, I love only the soft light 
of the unclouded sacred jewel.” 
Mitsurugino hikari suzamashi sawa aredo kumoranu tama no uruoi o omou.
みつるぎの　光すざましさはあれど　くもらぬ玉の潤ひを思ふ
You, the demon who lives through power, will, and blood! 
Who is it that questions your responsibility? 
(How sad it is that there is none who does so!)
Kenryoku to ishi to chi de ikiru akuma! Nanji no sekinin toumono wa darezo. 
(Daremo naki koso kanashikere.)
権力と意志と血で生きる悪魔! 汝の責任 問ふものは誰ぞ（誰もなきこそ悲しけれ）
There is a someone who acts with absolute power 
but takes no responsibility [for his actions]. 
His name is the state.
Zettai no iryoku ni ikite sekinin o motanumono ari. Na o kokka to iu.
絶対の威力に生きて責任を持たぬものあり　名を国家と云ふ
You who behave as a demon 
under the name of the state—
I despise you.
Kokka chō naniyorite ma no itonami o itonamu nanji ware nanji o nikumu.
国家てふ名によりて魔のいとなみをいとなむ汝　われ汝を悪む
You! 
Don’t dance on Singapore Island! 
Destruction is easy, but creation takes much time!
Kimitachi yo sonnani odoruna shōnantō hakai wa yasushi sōzō wa nagashi.
君達よ　そんなに踊るな昭南島　破くわいは易し創造は長し71 
It was also as an opponent to the war that Suzuki was remembered by his 
colleagues at Otani University, where Suzuki was a professor at the time. At 
an assembly for students at Otani University who had been conscripted and 
were about to enter the army, Suzuki is recorded to have spoken as follows:
71 SDZ, vol. 37, p. 36.
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As the war continued, student deferments were eventually halted, 
and many young men from the universities were conscripted and 
sent to the battlefields. Otani held a sending-off gathering for the 
university’s departing students, with Suzuki chosen to give the 
address. As he stood at the podium, he was silent for a time, perhaps 
at a loss for words to say to the young men about to depart for the 
fields of death. His silence must have impressed a sense of gravity 
upon the students. Finally, he began to speak, saying, “How tragi-
cally unfortunate this is. What possible reason do young Americans 
and young Japanese have to kill each other? How long will this 
absurd war go on? But someday it will come to an end. When it 
does, it will be the job of you young people to create a new world 
and a new age. So you must not die during this war. You must come 
back alive, even if that means being taken prisoners of war.” 
Suzuki’s address, so different from the war-promoting speeches 
that were customary at such gatherings, deeply affected not only 
the newly conscripted students but also everyone else present. His 
words are still remembered today. Suzuki’s talk as quoted above 
was recorded by Hino Kenshi, a temple priest whose father, a for-
mer Otani student present at the gathering, repeated Suzuki’s state-
ment “on numerous occasions.” Many other former students recall 
Suzuki’s words in almost exactly the same way.72 
Earlier, when the Pearl Harbor attack was announced at an Otani University 
faculty meeting on 8 December 1941, Suzuki created quite a commotion 
among the assembled faculty members by stating, “With this, Japan will be 
destroyed. What will destroy it is Shinto and the militarists.”73 
This, at least, is not a point that would be disputed by Victoria. In the later 
sections of Zen at War he concedes that the war against the Western Allies 
was not supported by Suzuki, but he insists that Suzuki was opposed only 
to this aspect of the war, knowing full well from his years of residence in 
the West that Japan could not prevail against such mighty industrial powers. 
Regarding the war on the Asian continent, Victoria says, Suzuki was “quite 
enthusiastic”:
Nowhere in Suzuki’s writings does one find the least regret, let 
72 Quoted from Ueda 2007, p. 36.
73 Kitanishi 2006, p. 13. 
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alone an apology for Japan’s earlier colonial efforts in such places 
as China, Korea, or Taiwan. In fact, he was quite enthusiastic 
about Japanese military activities in Asia. In an article addressed 
specifically to young Japanese Buddhists written in 1943 he stated: 
“Although it is called the Greater East Asia War, its essence is that 
of an ideological struggle for the culture of East Asia. Buddhists 
must join in this struggle and accomplish their essential mission.” 
One is left with the suspicion that for Suzuki things didn’t really go 
wrong until Japan decided to attack the United States.74 
Suzuki was certainly well aware of the futility of going to war with the 
United States, as indicated by several passages quoted by Victoria.75 But it 
is difficult on several levels to agree with Victoria’s contention that Suzuki 
supported the war in China. First, Suzuki’s letters of 10 February 1940 and 8 
August 1941, quoted above, show that, far from being enthusiastic about the 
conflict, he viewed it as an utter disaster. Moreover, even on a purely semantic 
level, Victoria’s interpretation of Suzuki’s words is ruled out by the fact that 
the term “Greater East Asia War” (Daitōa sensō 大東亜戦争) never referred to 
the war with China alone; the name came into existence only on 10 December 
1941, two days after the Pearl Harbor attack, when it was applied by decision 
of the Japanese Cabinet to both the war with China and the war with the West-
ern Allies.76 Thus, when Suzuki wrote these words in June 1943, no reader 
would have interpreted them as referring solely to the war in China.
Most importantly, it is obvious from the overall context of the quoted 
sentences that Suzuki was not referring to the actual fighting in China at all. 
The essay containing the quoted passage, entitled “Daijō bukkyō no sekaiteki 
shimei: Wakaki hitobito ni yosu” 大乗仏教の世界的使命：若き人々に寄す (The 
Global Mission of Mahayana Buddhism: Addressed to Young People),77 sets 
forth Suzuki’s position on the cultural encounter between East and West, and 
the proper role of Mahayana Buddhism in facing the resulting tensions and 
challenges. I will quote from it in some length, not only to contextualize the 
74 Victoria 1997, p. 151.
75 See, for example, Victoria 1997, p. 152; p. 208, n. 15. Suzuki was indeed realistic about 
Japan’s relative weakness with regard to the United States, but, as we have seen, his opposition 
to Japan’s wars was much broader.
76 See the Nihonshi daijiten 日本史大辞典, s.v. “Daitōa sensō.” It is generally agreed that the 
name did not apply retroactively to the war prior to December, 1941.
77 SDZ, vol. 32, pp. 420–35. Originally published in the Ōtani gakuhō 大谷学報, June 20, 1943 
issue.
106
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  1
sentence cited by Victoria but also to show something of the broad general 
lines along which Suzuki was thinking during the wartime years. The article 
begins with the following paragraphs:
In the almost eighty years that have passed since the Meiji Restora-
tion [1868], great progress has been made in all of the non-Buddhist 
areas of culture. Contact with the cultures of the West was for the 
Japanese a terrible shock, but we were able to respond in an appro-
priate fashion. This is something that anyone who compares our 
culture now with what it was at the beginning of the Meiji period 
would readily acknowledge.
Never in history have we experienced such rapid progress in 
every aspect of our lives, whether in the advance of science and 
technology, the accumulation of capital, the growth in social com-
plexity, or the momentous transformation of political ideas. In the 
East, and particularly in Japan, this “raised the heavens and shook 
the earth,” and it continues to do so today, although in the nations 
of the West this type of progress may no longer seem surprising, 
owing to the qualitative differences between East and West.
Even nowadays we can perceive how flourishing is the intel-
lectual competition between these qualitatively different cultures. 
I believe that this phenomenon of rivalry, trade-off, confrontation, 
struggle, or whatever you wish to call it will continue for quite some 
time. Then, out of these struggles and rivalries will inevitably arise 
a natural integration of the cultures of East and West. Before then, 
however, we must undergo many trials and tribulations, particularly 
with regard to thought and culture.78 
The article continues throughout in much the same vein, exploring the impli-
cations of Western technology and thought for the material and spiritual cul-
ture of Japan and discussing the challenges and benefits of Western rationality 
for traditional Japanese ways of thinking (often in a manner quite critical of 
the latter). Arguing for the importance of transcending Japan’s cultural limita-
tions in order to encompass the Western outlook, Suzuki sharply criticizes the 
response of Buddhism to the Western challenge:
What changes has Buddhism made in thought and lifestyle as a 
78 SDZ, vol. 32, pp. 420–21.
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result of this jolt from the West to its environment? The fact is, in 
the eighty years since the Meiji Restoration, Japanese Buddhism 
has done nothing. Although Buddhism, even should its “body” 
perish, is certain to sprout anew as long as any life remains in 
its teachings, those teachings are nevertheless spread by human 
beings, human beings who represent one aspect of the body of Bud-
dhism. Should that aspect of the body disappear, revival of the Way 
itself would become a very difficult and time-consuming process, 
allowing undesirable teachings to run rampant. Thus the protection, 
growth, and welfare of the truth must be attended to in a conscious, 
rational, and systematic manner. Japanese Buddhism today is facing 
an extreme crisis. If at this time we miss the opportunity to turn it 
around, we will witness the tragic demise of Buddhism’s very life. 
Indications of this are visible everywhere.
The political upheavals of the Meiji Restoration dealt a severe 
blow to the feudal Buddhist organizations, depriving them of much 
of their material support and shaking their ideological foundations. 
Fortunately, prominent priests at the time were able to contain the 
crisis, but ever since then the Buddhists—especially the bonzes—
have been, in their thought and their spiritual practice, like “the bug 
in the lion.”79 Herein we see the root of the problem. Day by day 
the toxin spreads. The Japanese Buddhist organizations must deal 
with the fact that they have become little more than funeral-service 
associations, and there is little they can do about it. The organiza-
tions are full of shavepates, but one can only wonder if any of them 
are devoting thought to the serious and very real problem of the 
cultural and ideological tension between East and West.
Most of the clergy is content to confine itself to understand-
ing, protecting, and maintaining what might be called “Nihonteki” 
bukkyō「日本的」仏教 (“Japanese-style” Buddhism). The Nihonteki 
bukkyō they speak of is nothing but the relics of Buddhism past—
relics that, in today’s world situation, should not be adhered to. 
I’ve heard it said that the best defense is a good offence. What the 
term Nihonteki should imply in this day and age is the perspicacity 
to leave the past behind and open up new approaches. Instead of 
living in rigid conformity with “the past,” we must renounce it and 
79 A Buddhist simile meaning a parasite that drains the life from its host.
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out of this renunciation bring new life into being. If we do not do 
this, even conforming to the past will become impossible. Recently 
one hears terms like tenshin 転進 [a positive change in course] or 
hattenteki kaishō 発展的解消 [the dissolution of an organization to 
make way for its existence in a different form]; in all of them the 
operating principle is the logic of negation. Needless to say, this is 
not negation in the ordinary sense of the word.
Kamakura Buddhism renounced the Buddhism of the Nara and 
Heian periods in the process of developing a new, more grass-
roots form of Japanese Buddhism. This opportunity was afforded 
to Japan by the decline of the courtly culture, the ascendancy of 
the warrior class, the renewed contact with Chinese literature, the 
struggle against the Mongol invasions, and other factors. As a result 
of these stimuli Buddhism during the Kamakura age was able to rid 
itself of the conceptual, aristocratic, and leisure-oriented character 
that had typified it during the Nara and Heian eras. The result was a 
reawakening of Buddhism to its original mission.80
Next comes the paragraph from which Victoria draws his citation:
In the course of the ensuing six or seven hundred years, however, 
Buddhism has bound itself with new fetters. Today we are blessed 
with the opportunity to cast these fetters aside and advance another 
step. In response to the influx of the different culture and thought of 
the West, Buddhists, as Buddhists, must renounce those things in 
their way of thinking—those things from their past—that deserve 
to be renounced, and develop new approaches. We speak of the 
“Greater East Asia” War, but its essence, ideologically, should be 
seen as a struggle by East Asian culture.81 Buddhists must join in this 
80 SDZ, vol. 32, pp. 423–24.
81 Victoria’s reading, “its essence is that of an ideological struggle for the culture of East Asia” 
(Victoria 1997, p. 151), although possible, is difficult to support either in light of the context of 
the article, or of the original Japanese: sono jitsu wa shisōteki ni tōa bunka no kōsō de aru to 
mite yoi その実は思想的に東亜文化の抗争であると見てよい.
It is of interest to note that, although it does not change the overall meaning of what Suzuki 
is saying, it is likely that there was a misprint here in which tōa 東亜 (East Asia) was substi-
tuted for tōzai 東西 (East-West). In the original text, Suzuki places quotation marks around 
the “Greater East Asian” in the term “Greater East Asian War,” suggesting that he wished to 
express a contrast between “East Asia” and something else. The fact that the entire article is 
a discussion of the differences and tensions between Eastern and Western cultures, combined 
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struggle and fulfill their original mission as Buddhists.82 
Suzuki, beginning a new section at this point, explains the nature of this conflict:
In the area of culture and ideology, though one may speak of 
“struggle,” “conflict,” or “rivalry,” what is involved is not throw-
ing your opponent to the ground and pinning him so that he cannot 
move. This is especially true when the opponent is not necessarily 
your inferior intellectually, materially, historically, and otherwise. 
In such cases not only is it impossible to destroy him, but even if 
it were it would not be to your benefit to do so. Western culture is 
qualitatively different from that of the East, but for precisely that 
reason it should be accepted. And those on the other side need 
to accept our culture as well. It is important to arouse the frame 
of mind that seeks to accomplish this. That, truly, is the role with 
which Buddhism is charged, for it is Buddhist thought that func-
tions at the center of the Eastern way of thinking.83 
It is obvious that this article has nothing to do with expressing support for 
the war in China or calling for young Buddhists to join the army and go off to 
fight on the continent. Rather, Suzuki is appealing for a positive, determined 
engagement with the culture of the West as a way not only to enrich Japa-
nese culture but also to revive the life of Japanese Buddhism. Far from an 
expression of enthusiasm for the Asian war, it is indicative of precisely those 
qualities in Suzuki that caused him to oppose the outlook and actions that led 
the militarists to invade the continent. It is particularly indicative of Suzuki’s 
outlook that this article was published in 1943 at the height of the wartime 
xenophobia, a time when for most Japanese the common epithet for Western-
ers was kichiku beiei 鬼畜米英 (demon-animal Americans and English) and 
when English itself was forbidden in schools as the language of the enemy. 
Later in his essay Suzuki renews his call to Japanese Buddhism for a 
greater universality and sense of an international mission: 
with the fact that the two characters a 亜 and zai 西 can easily be confused when written by 
hand, suggests that the original manuscript, before being set to type, read, “We speak of the 
“Greater East Asia” War, but its essence, ideologically, should be seen as a struggle between 
Eastern and Western cultures” (“Daitōa” sensō to iu ga, sono jitsu wa shisōteki ni tōzai bunka 
no kōsō de aru to mite yoi 「大東亜」戦争と云ふが、その実は思想的に東西文化の抗争である
と見てよい). 
82 SDZ, vol. 32, p. 424.
83 SDZ, vol. 32, pp. 424–25.
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Japanese Buddhism has never been Mahayana Buddhism in the 
true sense of the term. It has always been too insular and too politi-
cal—qualities that suited it for existence in its cultural environment, 
but have rendered it unable at present to transcend its limits. Japa-
nese Buddhists have never had the missionary fervor to depart for 
foreign lands and live out their lives in the wild—in this regard we 
lag far behind the Christians, particularly the Catholics, with their 
indomitable spirit. It may be acceptable here in our own country 
to resign oneself to irrelevance, but Japanese Buddhism has failed 
to produce so much as a single individual willing to go abroad to 
dwell amongst foreign peoples, not knowing whether he will live or 
die, and sacrifice himself for the Way he believes in. This failure is 
a natural outcome, given the nature of “Japanese” Buddhism. . . .
Mahayana Buddhists must not only recognize that their faith is 
universal in nature, but also proclaim that universality via a univer-
sal logic on a global scale. This will probably require that tradition 
and history be set aside for a time. It is now required of us that we 
make a radical, 180-degree turn with regard to the world. The oppor-
tunity for this may be provided by a chance occurrence. Or it may 
be provided by an act of resistance against suppression by a certain 
group. In any event, regardless of what the direct catalyst might 
be, today, in this eighteenth year of the Shōwa era [1943], what the 
world asks of us is complete revolution in our culture and thought. 
It would seem to me that this call would be heard, deep in the heart, 
by some Mahayana Buddhist—no, more than that, I believe that it 
is heard by everyone! The problem is simply that we’re not yet fully 
prepared to act. Look at the way in which Shinran Shōnin 親鸞聖
人 (1173–1262) went against tradition when he felt the spirit of the 
times calling from the very depths of the earth.84 
There is one final point I would like to make with regard to this article. 
Toward the end Suzuki makes what is, in those days of government censor-
ship, about as close as possible to a direct appeal for his young readers to 
wake up to what was going on around them and not follow the lead of those 
who claim the spiritual superiority of the Japanese:
We must open our eyes and see how culture is being influenced in 
84 SDZ, vol. 32, pp. 430–32.  
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all of its aspects by modern thought—especially scientific thought. 
We cannot afford the shallow narcissism implicit in the attitude that 
“we [Japanese] are spiritual, those [Westerners] are materialistic.” 
The people who call themselves spiritual or claim a monopoly on 
morality are actually the most materialistic and immoral of all. 
What these people are up to is, in fact, obvious to any Buddhist with 
even the slightest capacity to observe within and watch without, 
though not to those who cover their eyes and ears and do as they’re 
told, turning right and turning left when ordered to; while I won’t 
say these people have been deceived, the truth is that they are not 
fully utilizing their senses.85 
While Victoria and others may wish that Suzuki had criticized Japanese 
militarism more directly, their failure to acknowledge that Suzuki did publish 
such indirect criticisms sadly distorts the historical record. Especially for a 
citizen whose personal circumstances—a long residence in the United States, 
an American spouse, and past criticism of the military—made him vulnerable 
to charges of sympathizing with the enemy, Suzuki’s words, mild as they 
may seem in hindsight, were actually quite courageous under a totalitarian 
regime.86 
 Victoria, in his attempts to find other evidence that Suzuki favored Japan’s 
military actions in China, quotes the following passage from the chapter “Zen 
and the Samurai” in Zen and Japanese Culture: 
There is a document that was very much talked about in connection 
with the Japanese military operations in China in the 1930s. It is 
known as the Hagakure, which literally means “Hidden under the 
Leaves,” for it is one of the virtues of the samurai not to display 
himself, not to blow his horn, but to keep himself away from the 
public eye and be doing good for his fellow beings.87 
The first line of this passage—the only mention of China in the entire chapter 
it appears in—is no more than a statement of fact. Indeed, if the Japanese 
military had acted in accordance with the words of this passage—not display-
ing itself, and doing good for its fellow beings—its problems in China would 
never have occurred in the first place. 
85 SDZ, vol. 32, pp. 434–35.
86 See, for example, n. 66, above.
87 Victoria 1997, p. 107. The original passage is found in Suzuki 1959, p. 70.
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Postwar Writings
This brings us to a consideration of Suzuki’s postwar writings, writings that 
are strongly critical of Japan’s wartime actions and the behavior of the Zen 
leadership. Let us begin with an article that appeared in the 1 September 1945 
issue of the journal Teiyū rinri 丁酉倫理. The date, a mere two weeks after the 
defeat and virtually simultaneous to Japan’s formal surrender on 2 September, 
suggests that the thoughts expressed by Suzuki were already well-formed, and 
perhaps already set to paper, by the war’s concluding months. Here are a few 
representative passages: 
This war lacked any just moral cause or argument, or any credible 
ideological background. The war that was started in Manchuria was 
an act of pure exploitation and imperialism. . . .
After the army had finished its work in Manchuria, it marched 
into northern China, saying that it was necessary to do so in order 
to secure Japan’s economic survival. Things went well for it there, 
and this was attributed to the “august powers of the emperor.” I’m 
sure this was the most unwelcome nuisance imaginable as far as 
the emperor himself was concerned. “August powers” are like the 
sword of life of Mañjuśrī or the demon-suppressing sword of Acala 
(Fudō Myōō 不動明王). Was it necessary for the Japanese army to 
wield such arms in either Manchuria or northern China? The Chi-
nese had done us no harm. . . . It was nothing other than a confirma-
tion that this was invasive, militaristic imperialism. . . .
As the so-called “Holy War” expanded from northern China to 
central China and on to southern China, the Japanese populace 
was kept completely in the dark. It seemed like the militarists and 
industrialists, swept up in their own momentum, could think only 
of advancing farther south. Then that inhuman atrocity commit-
ted in Nanjing—that unprecedented atrocity, news of which was 
concealed from the Japanese people but which was clearly reported 
abroad. People could not fathom out how such a thing could hap-
pen in a “Holy War,” and why the “Army of the Emperor” had to 
engage in such acts. . . .
The “Holy War” in central and southern China was a violation by 
us of the rights and interests of another nation. That other nation was 
not always an exemplar of charity and humanitarianism, of course, 
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but it is only to be expected that when one side uses force the other 
side will resist by using force also. That is the nature of war. Basi-
cally, there is nothing “holy” about any war. “Holiness” manifests 
itself only in that which transcends force. Yet the militarists insisted 
upon referring to their “Imperial” Army and their “Holy” War. . . .
Why did Japan deliberately press on with this recklessness? In 
this is revealed the thoughtlessness of the militarists. Unable to 
manage the “Holy War” in China, they extended it to all of East 
Asia under a new name. It was a vivid demonstration of the mili-
tarists’ and industrialists’ intellectual poverty. There was little that 
the ordinary populace could do, silenced as it was by gag laws and 
censorship, but it is incomprehensible to us why figures like senior 
officials and parliament members were unable to pressure the mili-
tarists and industrialists to stop their rash behavior. At the start of 
the conflict the military experienced some stunning successes, but 
although that may have been enough to mislead the people, among 
those who understood such matters it was recognized as extremely 
dangerous. In spite of this—or actually because of this—the 
authorities increasingly turned to deception and intimidation in 
their dealings with the people. The actions of the majority of the 
population were guided by mass psychology. Only a small number 
of intellectuals foresaw what was coming, but they were deprived 
in every sense of their freedom of action and expression, and could 
only look on helplessly from the sidelines. And, finally, the war 
ended in the situation we have today.88 
The sentiments expressed in these passages gave rise to a series of contempla-
tions by Suzuki, regarding the weaknesses of Japan that had led to its disastrous 
course, and on the possibilities for the distinctly Japanese spiritual renewal 
that he saw as essential to the full recovery of the nation. First expressed in 
his wartime article “The Global Mission of Mahayana Buddhism,” his ideas 
were developed primarily in a series of four books, all centered on the concept 
of “Japanese spirituality”: Nihonteki reisei 日本的霊性 (Japanese Spirituality, 
1944; revised edition, 1946), Reiseiteki Nihonteki jikaku 霊性的日本的自覚 (The 
Awakening of Japanese Spirituality, 1946), Reiseiteki nihon no kensetsu 霊性
的日本の建設 (The Construction of a Spiritual Japan, 1946), and Nihon no rei-
seika 日本の霊性化 (The Spiritualizing of Japan, 1947). 
88 SDZ, vol. 33, pp. 7–9.
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Suzuki regarded “Japanese spirituality”—in his view, the type of spiritual-
ity seen primarily in Japanese Pure Land figures like Hōnen 法然 (1133–1212) 
and Shinran—as the religious ideal most suited to the religious culture of 
the nation, and the best alternative to the failed State Shintoist ideology. His 
views on the subject were already developing during the war years. In June 
1945, two months before the Japanese surrender, Suzuki explained what he 
intended by the term “Japanese spirituality” in a lecture prepared for delivery 
at Higashi Honganji’s Kyōgaku Kenkyūsho 教学研究所 (Center for Shin Bud-
dhist Studies): 
I would like to say a word about the way in which I will use the 
word “Japan.” I intend it to refer only to the place and the people, 
and not to imply anything else. Thus, when I speak of “Japanese 
spiritual awakening,” I mean a spiritual awakening experienced by 
the people or populace that inhabit the land of Japan, a place that 
occupies a spatial location in a corner of East Asia. The concept of 
spirituality is, needless to say, a universal one, but the awakening to 
spirituality occurs only on an individual basis. And those individu-
als live in a certain land and belong to a certain people. This is why 
I feel it is possible to precede the term “spiritual awakening” with 
the word “Japanese.” . . .
To help prevent misunderstanding, let me stress that the term 
“Japanese” as I use it has absolutely no political implications. . . . 
Politics is always about power, and involves force, dominance, and 
suppression. Spirituality has nothing of this sort about it. Spiritual-
ity seeks the happiness of others; it strives to ease their suffering, 
it aspires to transcendence, it is infinitely compassionate. These 
are the sources of its strength. Unless strength arises from such 
sources, it invariably turns to repression, exclusion, and arrogance, 
and embraces imperialism, aggression, annexation, and all the other 
distortions of power. Nothing is more malign than “the sword that 
takes life” when it is uncontrolled by “the sword that gives life.” 
Spiritual awakening can never arise from politics. It is politics that 
must originate in spiritual awakening; the converse is fraudulent, 
and will inevitably lead to breakdown and confusion. We needn’t 
search far for examples—just look at Germany.89 
89 SDZ, vol. 9, pp. 164–66.
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I will not devote too much space to an analysis of Suzuki’s postwar writings. 
Although Zen at War regards Suzuki’s thought in these works as the product 
of a hypocritical conversion undergone only after the collapse of Japan’s war 
effort,90 it should be obvious from our overview of Suzuki’s writings that all 
of the main themes seen in his critical postwar writings—the doubts about 
State Shinto, the mistrust of the military establishment, the encouragement of 
a greater rationality for the Japanese, the recognition of a need for Buddhist 
reform—are in fact logically consistent with his positions dating back to the 
late nineteenth century.
One example will suffice, I think, as a response to Victoria’s attacks. In 
several places Victoria takes Suzuki to task for stating positions in his post-
war writings that all historians recognize as simple fact. Victoria writes, for 
example
Even in the midst of Japan’s utter defeat, Suzuki remained deter-
mined to find something praiseworthy in Japan’s war efforts. He 
described the positive side of the war as follows:
Through the great sacrifice of the Japanese people and nation, 
it can be said the various peoples of the countries of the Orient 
had the opportunity to awaken both economically and politi-
cally. . . . This was just the beginning, and I believe that after 
ten, twenty, or more years the various peoples of the Orient 
may well have formed independent countries and contributed 
to the improvement of the world’s culture in tandem with the 
various peoples of Europe and America.
Here, in an echo of his wartime writings, Suzuki continued to praise 
the “great sacrifice” the Japanese people allegedly made to “awaken 
the peoples of Asia.”91 
There is actually nothing controversial about Suzuki’s position: historians 
are in agreement that the Japanese military actions in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific provided an important impetus to the nationalist movements in the 
colonized nations of those regions, although the dynamics were complex and 
involved both pro- and anti-Japanese sentiments. And Suzuki was unquestion-
ably correct in his prediction that several decades after the war the East Asian 
90 Victoria 1997, pp. 147–52.
91 Ibid., pp. 150–51.
116
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  1
and Southeast Asian nations would attain independence.
Moreover, Victoria’s citation from Suzuki is quite selective. The full passage 
reads:
The great losses92 suffered by the Japanese people and nation can 
be said to have provided the various peoples of the countries of 
the East with the opportunity to awaken both economically and 
politically. Needless to say, embarking on the “Greater East Asia 
War” was a highly unreasonable course, the result of the Japanese 
militarists at the time instigating reckless campaigns that were 
supported by Japan’s “politicians.” But it would be a fine thing, I 
believe, if with this as a beginning the various peoples of the East 
are able in a few decades to form nations that are independent in 
every way, and are contributing to the improvement of the world’s 
culture in tandem with the various peoples of Europe and America. 
Asians originally learned of things like imperialism and colonial-
ism from Europe, but at the same time it was also from Europe that 
we learned of concepts like independence, freedom and equality, 
peaceful economics, and equal opportunity. Therefore I believe that 
we owe great respect to the people of Europe and America, who 
are the origin of these ideas that were planted in Asia. . . . With 
regard to this past war, Japan must bear its full share of moral and 
political responsibility. What is fortunate, however, is that Japan has 
renounced engagement in war and is venturing out, naked, among 
the nations of the world.93 
I will leave it to the reader to assess how fairly Suzuki’s position is represented 
in Zen at War, and I would hope that the reader keeps in mind Victoria’s treat-
ment of this straightforward and unambiguous passage when evaluating his 
interpretation of Suzuki’s writings on war and Bushido.
Several other issues brought up in Zen at War’s chapter on Suzuki’s postwar 
writings, such as his supposed enthusiasm for the war in China, have already 
been dealt with above and will not be considered further here.
There is one particular point raised by Suzuki in his postwar writings 
92 The original Japanese, daigisei 大犧牲, can be translated as “great sacrifice,” as Victoria did, 
but in the context of the entire passage, where Suzuki is discussing the damage inflicted by the 
Japanese military on its own nation and people, I believe that “great losses” is more accurate.
93 SDZ, vol. 8, p. 237.
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and cited in Zen at War that it is regrettable Victoria did not pursue more 
objectively:
With satori [enlightenment] alone, it is impossible [for Zen priests] 
to shoulder their responsibilities as leaders of society. Not only is it 
impossible, but it is conceited of them to imagine they could do so. 
. . . In satori there is a world of satori. However, by itself satori is 
unable to judge the right and wrong of war. With regard to disputes 
in the ordinary world, it is necessary to employ intellectual dis-
crimination. . . . For example, satori has no relation to economics. 
There may be no problem with economics as it was in the old days, 
but if one is dealing with the complexities of economic theory or 
international relations today, one has to have an adequate level of 
technical knowledge or one can’t even form an opinion. Satori by 
itself is inadequate to determine whether communist economics is 
good or bad.94 
Victoria, using this as simply more material with which to discredit Suzuki, 
misses what I believe is a sincere attempt on Suzuki’s part to address the most 
perplexing question raised by the material in Zen at War: Why did Zen mas-
ters, supposedly enlightened, cooperate in the war effort? Suzuki’s opinion 
on this matter as expressed in these comments relates back to the point made 
above about the value-neutral nature of the nondual meditative experience: 
such experience may be extremely helpful when it comes to discerning the 
true nature of the self and the suchness of the present moment, but alone it 
is of little use in reaching an accurate assessment of, say, the complex issues 
behind a war. A discussion of the entire issue of enlightenment and its relation 
to social ethics is beyond the scope of this paper, of course; I simply wish to 
express my disappointment that Victoria was unwilling to engage with even 
straightforward attempts by Suzuki to address the failings and weaknesses of 
his own spiritual tradition.
Conclusion
In the course of this article I have been very critical of Victoria’s presenta-
tion of Suzuki’s work and of Suzuki the man, so I would like to reiterate 
94 SDZ, vol. 28, p. 413. The portion before the second ellipsis appears in Victoria 1997, pp. 
148–49. 
118
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  1
what I said at the beginning. Overall I think that Victoria’s work has been of 
value—Japanese Buddhism, and particularly the Zen school, did unquestion-
ably cooperate in the militarist war effort, and it is important for the future 
development of Japanese Zen Buddhism that this fact be known and that the 
Zen institutions explore the reasons for and consequences of this cooperation. 
I for one encourage Victoria in his continuing efforts to remind us of this 
chapter in Japanese Zen’s history. Painful as this may be to many followers of 
the Zen tradition, it can in the long run have only the beneficial effect of moti-
vating a reassessment of what practice and enlightenment is, and of what role 
conscious ethical choice needs to play in the spiritual life of Zen, and indeed 
of all traditions that aim for the attainment of meditative insight.
I do not believe, however, that Victoria has presented a valid case against 
D.T. Suzuki as a proponent of Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific. We have 
seen that Suzuki was not averse to expressing his opinions on political issues 
in both his private correspondence, and, when he felt free to do so, in his pub-
lic writings. If, as Victoria claims, Suzuki had advocated Japanese militarism, 
one would expect to see explicit support for militarist positions not only in 
his prewar and wartime personal letters but also, and especially, in his public 
statements, given that such support would have been fully in line with the 
political and intellectual trends of the times. Instead one sees precisely the 
opposite. In cases where Suzuki directly expresses his position on the con-
temporary political situation—whether in his articles, public talks, or letters to 
friends (in which he would have had no reason to misrepresent his views)—he 
is clear and explicit in his distrust of and opposition to State Shinto, right-
wing thought, and the other forces that were pushing Japan toward militarism 
and war, even as he expressed interest in decidedly non-rightist ideologies like 
socialism. In this Suzuki’s standpoint was consistent from the late nineteenth 
century through to the postwar years. These materials reveal in Suzuki an 
intellectual independence, a healthy scepticism of political ideology and gov-
ernment propaganda, and a sound appreciation for human rights.
In contrast, those writings cited by Victoria as militarist in nature are almost 
conspicuous in their refusal to explicitly comment upon, much less support, 
contemporary political and military developments, and when read in their full 
context are seen to contain much material that is plainly not supportive of the 
Japanese military agenda. Suzuki clearly believed in the legitimacy of defen-
sive war, but when it came to the actual wars embarked upon by the Japanese 
military, Suzuki’s writings show that he recognized none of them as justified. 
Similarly, Suzuki was impressed by the martial ethics and ideals of Bushido, 
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but saw its highest expression in the skillful defusing of confrontation without 
resort to violence. He respected the samurai detachment toward life and death, 
and the average Japanese soldier’s retention of that detachment.95 Yet when 
it came to the reality of Japan’s young men being uselessly slaughtered on 
the battlefields at the order of government officials “with no religious convic-
tions,” he did not hesitate to declare, in a published article during the height 
of the war, that “to regard the foolhardy and senseless sacrifice of one’s life 
as Zen is a mish-mash idea. Zen absolutely never teaches one to throw one’s 
life away.”
If there are valid reasons for criticizing Suzuki’s actions during the war or 
anytime else, then certainly those reasons must be brought to light and thor-
oughly discussed. But I would hope that the discussion would accord equal 
weight to all of the available evidence, fully situate it in the social and histori-
cal context, and examine all possible interpretations. These issues involved 
are too important to deserve anything less.
ABBREVIATION
SDZ  Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙. Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū 鈴木大拙全集. New enlarged edi-
tion, 40 vols., ed. Hisamatsu Shin’ichi 久松真一, Yamaguchi Susumu 山口益, Furuta 
Shōkin 古田紹欽. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999–2003.
REFERENCES
Henshall, Kenneth G. 1999. A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower. London: MacMil-
lan Press.
Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦. 1975. Nihon fashizumuka no shūkyō 日本ファシズム下の宗教. 
Tokyo: Enuesu Shuppankai. 
Ishii Kōsei. 2004. Shūkyōsha no sensō sekinin: Ichikawa Hakugen, sono hito no kenshō o 
tōshite 宗教者の戦争責任:市川白弦 その人の検証を通して. In Bōryoku: Hakai to 
chitsujo 暴力:破壊と秩序. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Ives, Christopher. 1994. Ethical Pitfalls in Imperial Zen and Nishida Philosophy. In Rude Awaken-
ings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism, ed. James W. Heisig and 
John C. Maraldo. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.
Kirita Kiyohide. 1994. D. T. Suzuki on Society and the State. In Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto 
School, and the Question of Nationalism, ed. James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. 
95 See Suzuki 1959, p. 85.
120
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  1
Kitanishi Hiromu 北西弘. 2006. Kaisō: Suzuki Daisetsu sensei, sono ni. 回想:鈴木大拙先生 その
二. Zen bunka 禅文化 201, pp. 13–18.
———. 2007. Kaisō: Suzuki Daisetsu sensei, sono roku 回想:鈴木大拙先生 その六. Zen bunka 
206, pp. 116–20. 
Miyata Koichi. 2002. Critical Comments on Brian Victoria’s “Engaged Buddhism: A Skeleton in 
the Closet?” Journal of Global Buddhism 3, pp. 79–85. http://www.globalbuddhism.
org/3/miyata021.htm.
Oldenberg, Hermann, ed. 1964. Vinaya Piṭakaṃ. Vol. 1. London: Pali Text Society. 
Suzuki Daisetsu. 1906–7. The Zen Sect of Buddhism. The Journal of the Pali Text Society 15, 
pp. 8–43. 
———. 1907. A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy: Part 1. The Monist 17, pp. 415–
50. 
———. 1908a. A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy: Part 2. The Monist 18, pp. 242–
85.
———. 1908b. A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy: Part 3. The Monist 18, pp. 481–
509.
———. 1938. Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture. Kyoto: The Eastern 
Buddhist Society.
———. 1943. Zen to Bushidō 禅と武士道. In Bushidō no shinzui 武士道の神髄, ed. Bushidō 
Gakkai 武士道学会 and Handa Shin 半田信. Tokyo: Teikoku Shoseki Kyōkai.
———. 1959. Zen and Japanese Culture. New York: Pantheon Books. 
———. 1970. Reprint. Essays in Zen Buddhism. 3d Series, ed. Christmas Humphreys. London: 
Rider. Original edition, London: Luzac and Company, 1934.
Ueda Shizuteru. 2007. “Outwardly, Be Open; Inwardly, Be Deep”: D. T. Suzuki’s “East-
ern Outlook.” The Eastern Buddhist 38, nos. 1/2, pp. 8–40.
Victoria, Brian Daizen. 1997. Zen at War. New York: Weatherhill.
———. 2006. Zen at War. 2d ed. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 2007. Karma, War and Inequality in Twentieth Century Japan. Japan Focus, article 
ID 825. http://japanfocus.org/_Brian_Victoria-Karma__War_and_Inequality_in_
Twentieth_Century_Japan.
